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STAYS OF INJUNCTIVE RELIEF PENDING APPEAL: WHY
THE MERITS SHOULD NOT MATTER
JILL WIEBER LENS*
ABSTRACT
In Nken v. Holder, the Supreme Court delineated the standards that must guide a court's
discretion in deciding whether to stay injunctive relief pending appeal A "critical' factor is
whether the stay applicant has made a "strong showing" of her likelihood to succeed on the mer-
its of the appeal Because of the critical label it is not surprising to see lower courts issue long
decisions extensively predicting the decision of the appellate court on the merits. To preserve
her interest in judicial review, the stay applicant must effectively show that she will win
the appeal
Stays play an important role in appellate judicial review but have received little academic
commentary This Article is the first to specifically argue against the evaluation of the merits
within the decision to stay injunctive reliefpending appeal An evaluation of the merits, and the
current emphasis on the merit factor, is not supported historically, theoretically, or practically
Instead courts should look to whether a stay is necessary-due to any potentially changing cir-
cumstances, harm to the parties, and the public interest, similar to the other three Nken fac-
tors Courts must also explain their application of these stay factors. Otherwise, their decisions
seem unjustified, inconsistent, and illegitimate.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Even though reversals on appeals are supposed to have the effect of
undoing the lower courts' decisions, appellate courts do not actually have
an "undo" button. Circumstances may change in the meantime, such that
it doesn't really matter how the appellate court rules. Suppose a lower
court determines that a state can enforce a law requiring every doctor
who performs abortions to have admitting privileges at a local hospital.
An appeal is filed, but circumstances change in the meantime-clinics
close if their doctors cannot comply. The appellate court can reverse the
lower court's judgment and cease enforcement of the law, but the clinics
are already closed. And they have been closed for so long that they are
unlikely to reopen. There is no undo button, and the practical circum-
stances, not the appellate court, controlled the outcome. Once the egg is
scrambled, even a mighty appellate court can't unscramble it.'
Courts do have one remedy to stop the egg from becoming scrambled
in the first place-a stay pending appeal. Stays have played a part in
numerous, recent high-profile cases, even if they go unnoticed. There is a
reason that same-sex marriages did not (usually) automatically begin
even after a court had enjoined enforcement of a state's ban on same-sex
marriage. That reason is a stay.
The Supreme Court has delineated the four factors that federal courts
must use to evaluate requests for stays of injunctive relief pending ap-
peal. 2 A "critical" factor is whether the stay applicant made a "strong
showing" that it is likely to succeed on the ultimate merits of the appeal.3
Thus, to obtain a stay-to maintain the usefulness of an appeal-an ap-
plicant has to show, strongly, that she is likely to win on appeal.
The emphasis and evaluation of the merits are inconsistent with the
history behind, the theory underlying, and the practical circumstances of
granting stays. English chancery court practice-the same authority the
Supreme Court looked to when defining federal courts' power to issue a
stay-did not include an evaluation of the merits of the appeal. 4 Addi-
tionally, a focus on the merits is not supported by the court-defined main
purpose of stays, which is to enable meaningful judicial review, both for
the appellate court and the parties. Last, practically, an evaluation of the
merits makes little sense given the time frame and the unfortunate nat-
ural inclination to match the later ultimate merits decision to that initial
merits prediction. Considering the merits can only get in the way of
evaluating the factors that are consistent with history and theory:
whether the circumstances could change in a way that would interfere
1. In re CGI Indus., Inc., 27 F.3d 296, 299 (7th Cir. 1994).
2. Nken v. Holder, 556 U.S. 418, 434 (2009).
3. Id.
4. See infra Section III.A.
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with the appellate court issuing meaningful relief, the harm to the par-
ties with or without a stay, and the public interest.
Equally important to the application of the correct factors is the ex-
planation of that application. All over the nation, injunctions prohibiting
states from enforcing their bans on same-sex marriage were stayed be-
cause of a two-sentence (unexplained) stay issued by the Supreme
Court;5 yes, the same Court that cautioned the need to constrain a court's
discretion in granting relief pending appeal frequently fails to explain
how it applied the law in granting or refusing that relief.6 Regardless,
the stays on injunctions prohibiting states from enforcing their bans on
same-sex marriage were likely appropriate. But without explanation,
there is no justification for the Court's decision and no assurance that it
complies with the governing law. The rule of law demands more.
Part II of this Article explains courts' inherent power to issue stays
pending appeal and the Nken standard. It also explores two recent appli-
cations of Nken where the courts placed heavy importance on the merits.
Part III argues that an emphasis on the merits is not historically, theo-
retically, or practically supported, and also delineates the factors that
courts should consider. Part IV addresses the legitimacy of stay decisions
and argues that explanation of decisions is needed.
II. THE STANDARD FOR STAYING INJUNCTIVE RELIEF PENDING APPEAL
A court's inherent power to stay an injunction pending appeal is also
codified in the Federal Rules of Civil and Appellate Procedure. The Su-
preme Court has separately clarified the factors courts must use to guide
their discretion in determining whether to issue that stay under
the Rules.
A. Power to Stay
A federal court's inherent power to stay the judgment pending appeal
ultimately derives from the All Writs Act, which "preserved in the grant
of authority to federal courts [the power] to 'issue all writs necessary or
appropriate in aid of their respective jurisdictions and agreeable to the
usages and principles of law.' "7
The power has become more specific depending on whether the judg-
ment below was legal, meaning for monetary damages, or equitable, in-
cluding granting injunctive relief. This distinction is apparent in Federal
5. See infra Section IV.A.
6. See infra Section IV.A.
7. Nken, 556 U.S. at 426; see also 28 U.S.C. § 1651(a) (2012). This authority originally ap-
peared in the Judiciary Act of 1789. Nken, 556 U.S. at 426 (citing Scripps-Howard Radio, Inc. v.
FCC, 316 U.S. 4, 10 n.4 (1942)). This power "ordinarily is exercised by the appellate court itself but
also may be exercised by a single judge of the court of appeals in emergency circumstances." 11
CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 2908, at 731 (3d ed. 2012).
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Rule of Civil Procedure 62. Rule 62(a) provides an automatic fourteen-
day stay on the execution of monetary judgments.8 After those fourteen
days, an appellant can "obtain a stay" by posting a "supersedeas bond."9
The stay will be effective "when the court approves the bond."10 Many
courts describe this Rule as automatically entitling the applicant to a
stay as a matter of "right" once the bond is posted." Courts will even
grant stays of execution of monetary judgments when the stay applicant
is unable to post a bond for the full amount of the judgment or unable to
post any bond. 1 2 In all, these provisions make obtaining a stay of execu-
tion of a legal, monetary judgment relatively easy.
None of these provisions apply, however, if the underlying judgment
involves injunctive relief. No fourteen-day automatic stay exists.1 3 Addi-
tionally, the provision allowing a stay based on the posting of a bond does
not apply to such an appeal. 14 Rule 62 does recognize, however, that if
the "appeal is pending from an interlocutory order or final judgment that
grants, dissolves, or denies an injunction, the court may suspend, modify,
restore, or grant an injunction on terms for bond or other terms that se-
cure the opposing party's rights.""
8. FED. R. Civ. P. 62(a).
9. Id at 62(d).
10. Id
11. See, e.g, Eurasia Int'l, Ltd. v. Holman Shipping, Inc., 411 F.3d 578, 585 (5th Cir. 2005)
("FED. R. Civ. P. 62(d) provides that a party is entitled to an automatic stay of proceedings to
enforce a judgment upon appeal when it posts a supersedeas bond."); Frommert v. Conkright,
639 F. Supp. 2d 305, 308 (W.D.N.Y. 2009) ("[T]he party posting the bond is entitled to a stay as
of right; the court has no discretion to deny the stay itself, but only to fix the amount of (or to
waive) the bond."); New Access Commc'ns LLC v. Qwest Corp., 378 F. Supp. 2d 1135, 1138 (D.
Minn. 2005) ("An appellant may request and obtain a stay of judgment pending appeal as a
matter of right upon posting a supersedeas bond."); Marcoux v. Farm Serv. & Supplies, Inc., 290
F. Supp. 2d 457, 485 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) ("[S]tay of the judgment pending appeal is automatic upon
the posting of a supersedeas bond."); see also 11 WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 7, § 2905, at 712-13
("The stay issues as a matter of right in cases within Rule 62(d), and is effective when the super-
sedeas is approved by the court." (footnote omitted)).
12. See, e.g., Fed. Prescription Serv., Inc. v. Am. Pharm. Ass'n, 636 F.2d 755, 760-61 (D.C.
Cir. 1980) (explaining that Rule 62(d) does not limit a district court's power to issue unsecured
stays through exercise of its sound discretion); Marcoux, 290 F. Supp. 2d at 485 ("Whether to
grant a stay without a supersedeas bond is a matter that remains within this Court's sound
discretion."); Alexander v. Chesapeake, Potomac & Tidewater Books, Inc., 190 F.R.D. 190, 192
(E.D. Va. 1999) ("[T]his Rule leaves unimpaired a district court's inherent, discretionary power
to stay judgments pending appeal on terms other than a full supersedeas bond.").
13. FED. R. CIV. P. 62(a)(1).
14. Id at 62(d).
15. Id. at 62(c). This Rule also enables courts to issue affirmative injunctive relief pending
appeal. Id Different standards govern stays of injunctive relief and granting affirmative injunc-
tive relief because '[t]here is ... a considerable reluctance in granting an injunction pending
appeal when to do so, in effect, is to give the appellant the ultimate relief being sought." 11
WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 7, § 2904, at 702-03 (footnote omitted). Thus, standards different
than Nken apply-requiring the applicant "to show a great likelihood that he will prevail when
the case finally comes to be heard on the merits and that a denial of interim relief will result in
irreparable injury." Id § 2904, at 703-04. Although many arguments in this Article may apply
[Vol. 43:1319
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Rule 62 also clarifies that it does not, in any way, limit the power of
the appellate court to take similar action. Specifically, the appellate
court or any of its judges or justices may still "stay proceedings-or sus-
pend, modify, restore, or grant an injunction-while an appeal is pend-
ing," or "issue an order to preserve the status quo or the effectiveness of
the judgment to be entered." 16 Moreover, Federal Rule of Appellate Pro-
cedure 8 specifically empowers an appellate court to grant a stay or in-
junction pending appeal." Rule 8 clarifies that a party seeking such re-
lief "must ordinarily move first in the district court."18 If denied there,
the applicant can seek a stay from the appellate court.19
B. Standard
Neither the statutory authority nor the Rules, however, indicate the
factors courts should consider when determining whether to issue stays
of injunctive relief. The Supreme Court introduced the factors in Hilton
v. Bra unski]] 2 0 and more recently discussed them in Nken v. Holder.2 1
Stays are not available as a matter of right, even if irreparable injury
will occur without the stay.22 The issuance of a stay is left to the court's
discretion and will depend on the facts of each particular case. 2 3 Still, le-
gal standards govern the exercise of that discretion. A motion to a court's
"discretion is a motion, not to its inclination, but to its judgment; and its
judgment is to be guided by sound legal principles." 2 4 Those sound legal
principles, which a stay applicant will have the burden to show, 25 are:
(1) whether the stay applicant has made a strong showing that he is
likely to succeed on the merits; (2) whether the applicant will be irrep-
arably injured absent a stay; (3) whether issuance of the stay will sub-
equally as well to the standards governing the granting of affirmative injunctive relief, this
Article addresses stays of injunctive relief only.
16. FED. R. CIV. P. 62(g).
17. FED. R. APP. P. 8(a)(2).
18. Id. at 8(a)(1). A recognized exception is if the party seeking relief first from the district
court "would be impracticable." Id at 8(a)(2)(A)(i).
19. Id at 8(a)(2)(A)(ii). The United States Supreme Court has separate statutory authority to
grant a stay pending the filing and review of a petition for writ of certiorari. See 28 U.S.C. §
2101(f) (2012).
20. 481 U.S. 770, 776-77 (1987).
21. 556 U.S. 418, 434 (2009).
22. Id at 433 (quoting Virginian Ry. Co. v. United States, 272 U.S. 658, 672 (1926)). If
stays were available as a matter of right, the number of appeals would likely increase. Chafin v.
Chafin, 133 S. Ct. 1017, 1027 (2013). Stays from execution of monetary judgments are available
as a matter of right, however. See supra notes 8-12 and accompanying text.
23. Nken, 556 U.S. at 433.
24. Id at 434 (quoting Martin v. Franklin Capital Corp., 546 U.S. 132, 139 (2005)).
25. Id at 433-34.
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stantially injure the other parties interested in the proceeding; and (4)
where the public interest lies.2 6
To clarify the factors a bit, the Court explained that the applicant
must show more than some possibility of irreparable injury.27 Additional-
ly, factor three "calls for assessing the harm to the opposing party."28
When the party opposing the stay is the government, this third factor
merges with the fourth because the government's interest is the
public intere st.29
One thing the Court did not clarify, however, is the "strong showing"
of likely success on the merits factor.3 0 The Court did explain that "[i]t is
not enough that the chance of success on the merits be 'better than neg-
ligible.' "31 But that seems inherent in the required strong showing; it is
not possible to make a strong showing of a likelihood to succeed if the
applicant shows only a better than negligible chance.
26. Id at 434 (quoting Hilton v. Braunskill, 481 U.S. 770, 776 (1987)). As the Court noted,
there is "substantial overlap" between the Nken factors and the factors used to issue prelimi-
nary injunctions. Id. Those factors are that the plaintiff is: "likely to succeed on the merits, that
he is likely to suffer irreparable harm in the absence of preliminary relief, that the balance of
equities tips in his favor, and that an injunction is in the public interest." Winter v. Nat. Res.
Def. Council, 555 U.S. 7, 20 (2008). There is disagreement about whether the Court allowed the
factors to operate on a sliding scale in Winter. See, e.g., Jean C. Love, Teaching Preliminary
Injunctions After Winter, 57 ST. LOuIS U. L.J. 689, 706-07 (2013); Rachel A Weisshaar, Hazy
Shades ofWinter: Resolving the Circuit Split over Preliminary Injunctions, 65 VAND. L. REV.
1011, 1017 (2012); Bethany M. Bates, Note, Reconciliation After Winter: The Standard for Pre-
liminary Injunctions in Federal Courts, 111 COLUM. L. REV. 1522, 1523 (2011).
The factors for stays and preliminary injunctions may overlap, but they still differ. The first
factor differs regarding the apparent burden of proof-a stay applicant must make a "strong
showing" of likely success, but a movant for a preliminary injunction need only show that he is
likely to succeed. Nken, 556 U.S. at 434; Winter, 555 U.S. at 20. The language of the third factor
also differs, but the considerations are similar. The Nken third factor looks to how the opposing
party would be harmed by a stay, and balancing of the equities also looks to how the parties
would be affected by the preliminary injunction. Nken, 556 U.S. at 434; Winter, 555 U.S. at 20.
According to the Court, the overlap makes sense because "similar concerns arise whenever a
court order may allow or disallow anticipated action before the legality of that action has been
conclusively determined." Nken, 556 U.S. at 434; see also Ohio v. Nuclear Regulatory Comm'n,
812 F.2d 288, 290 (6th Cir. 1987); Busboom Grain Co. v. Interstate Commerce Comm'n, 830
F.2d 74, 75 (7th Cir. 1987) (discussing preliminary injunction cases and explaining that "the
same considerations should inform the disposition of applications for stays of administrative
decisions"); Lopez v. Heckler, 713 F.2d 1432, 1435 (9th Cir. 1983) ("The standard for evaluating
stays pending appeal is similar to that employed by district courts in deciding whether to grant
a preliminary injunction."). With a preliminary injunction, the trial court must make that deci-
sion at the very beginning of the lawsuit, well before it determines the merits. With a stay, the
court must make that decision at the very beginning of the appeal, well before it determines the
merits of the appeal. Although preliminary injunctions and stays share these concerns, the two
mechanisms work differently. See infra note 165 and accompanying text.
27. Nken, 556 U.S. at 434.
28. Id at 435.
29. Id
30. Id at 434.
31. Id
[Vol. 43:1319
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The plain language of strong showing appears to be a much higher
burden than "better than negligible." It also seems higher than the bur-
den for a preliminary injunction, which requires the movant to show only
that he is likely to succeed on the merits.3 2 Some have interpreted this
preliminary-injunction burden "to imply that the plaintiff must show
that success is more likely than not," which is the same burden of proof
the plaintiff has on the ultimate merits in a civil proceeding.33 Applied to
Nken, then, the movant must make a strong showing of more likely than
not, which is arguably even more difficult than the ultimate burden on
appeal (the more likely than not burden). Regardless, even if the burden
of proof to obtain a stay is equal to the burden of proof at the merits
stage, the request for the stay is resolved long before the appellate briefs
and oral arguments are completed.
Maybe the Court did not mean to impose such a difficult burden on
the stay movant; maybe it meant something less. But it is difficult to
reach that conclusion when the Court used the word "strong," which au-
tomatically seems like a more difficult burden than what is required for
a preliminary injunction.3 4
Another thing the Court could have clarified is its classification of the
merits and irreparable injury factors as "the most critical."35 Does that
mean a stay applicant can never succeed if she cannot show both of the
two critical factors? Or, does the stay applicant need only show one of
these two critical factors, meaning an applicant can obtain a stay without
that strong showing on the merits?3 6 IS it possible to obtain a stay without
showing either of those critical factors? The answers are unknown.
32. Winter v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, 555 U.S. 7, 19 (2008).
33. Kevin J. Lynch, The Lock-In Effect ofPreliminary Injunctions, 66 FLA. L. REV. 779, 797
(2014).
34. See Friendship Edison Pub. Charter Sch. Collegiate Campus v. Nesbitt, 704 F. Supp.
2d 50, 53 (D.D.C. 2010) (rejecting a possibility of success standard because of its ease in that
"[t]here is, after all, always some possibility of a successful appeal"); Hubbard v. United States,
496 F. Supp. 2d 194, 198 (D.D.C. 2007) ("It is particularly important for the movant to demon-
strate a substantial likelihood of success on the merits."); Am. Cetacean Soc'y. v. Baldrige, 604
F. Supp. 1411, 1414 (D.D.C. 1985) ("The first, and most important, hurdle which the petitioners
must overcome is the requirement that they present a strong likelihood of prevailing on the
merits of their appeal."(emphasis added)).
The Court also does not use the word "strong" when describing the showing necessary to ob-
tain a stay pending the Court's review of a certiorari petition. The factors relevant to the merits
in that context require the applicant to show "(1) a reasonable probability that four Justices will
consider the issue sufficiently meritorious to grant certiorari" and "(2) a fair prospect that a
majority of the Court will vote to reverse the judgment below." Hollingsworth v. Perry, 558 U.S.
183, 190 (2010).
35. Nken, 556 U.S. at 434.
36. Thus, it is unclear whether the factors operate on a sliding scale, the same question
that exists for the application of preliminary injunction factors. See, e.g., Mazurek v. United
States, No. 99-2003 C/W 99-2229, 2001 WL 260064, at *1 (E.D. La. Jan. 11, 2001) (refusing to
apply the factors for granting a stay "in a mechanical fashion").
2016] 1325
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C. High -Profile Recent Applications
The Court required a "strong showing" of likely success on the merits
and called the same factor "critical."37 Not surprisingly, lower courts have
emphasized this factor. Two recent applications of Nken by the Fifth Cir-
cuit Court of Appeals demonstrate this emphasis.
1. Planned Parenthood of Greater Texas Surgical Health Services v.
Abbott3 8
On October 28, 2013, a federal district court found certain Texas re-
strictions on abortions unconstitutional.3 9 Specifically, the district court
permanently enjoined enforcement of the required hospital admitting
privileges and the limitations on the provision of medication abortions. 4 0
Part of the district court's finding of unconstitutionality was based on the
conclusion that the restrictions would cause abortion clinics to close.41
"The record reflects that 24 counties in the Rio Grande Valley would be
left with no abortion provider because those providers do not have admit-
ting privileges and are unlikely to get them." 4 2
The State appealed that decision to the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals
and also asked for a stay of the district court's opinion. 43 Days later, the
Fifth Circuit applied Nken and granted that stay.44 All but four pages of
the opinion were devoted to the State's "strong showing that it is likely to
succeed on the merits"-that the State would likely be able to establish
the constitutionality of its laws. 45 In the last paragraph of the opinion,
the Fifth Circuit mentioned that the State had "made an adequate show-
ing as to the other factors." 4 6 Specifically, if the State was enjoined, "the
State necessarily [would suffer] the irreparable harm of denying the pub-
lic interest in the enforcement of its laws." 47 Also, because the State was
a party, "its interest and harm merge[d] with that of the public." 4 8 The
Fifth Circuit acknowledged that the plaintiffs' "interests would be
harmed by staying the injunction, [but held that] given the State's likely
37. Nken, 556 U.S. at 434.
38. 134 S. Ct. 506 (2013).
39. Planned Parenthood of Greater Tex. Surgical Health Servs. v. Abbott, 951 F. Supp. 2d
891 (W.D. Tex. 2013).
40. Id. at 909.
41. Id. at 900. This conclusion is specific to the admitting privileges requirement. Id.
42. Id.
43. Planned Parenthood of Greater Tex. Surgical Health Servs. v. Abbott, 734 F.3d 406,
409 (5th Cir. 2013).
44. Id. at 419.
45. Id at 411-19.
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success on the merits, this [was] not enough, standing alone, to outweigh
the other factors."4 9
Because of the stay, the hospital admitting privileges and medication
abortion restrictions went into effect immediately. "As a practical matter,
the Fifth Circuit's decision to stay the injunction meant that abortion clin-
ics in Texas whose physicians do not have admitting privileges . . . were
forced to cease offering abortions." 0 And, almost half of the forty abortion
clinics in Texas closed." "[W]omen who were planning to receive abortions
at those clinics were forced to go elsewhere-in some cases 100 miles or
more-to obtain a safe abortion, or else not to obtain one at all."5 2
Planned Parenthood sought relief from the Supreme Court, filing an
application to vacate the stay with Justice Scalia, who presided over
emergency motions from the Fifth Circuit. Justice Scalia referred the
application to the entire Court, which denied it, finding no error in the
Fifth Circuit's opinion.53 Most of Justice Scalia's majority opinion re-
counted the Fifth Circuit's conclusions on the four Nken factors.5 4 He also
criticized the dissent for believing a stay to be inappropriate despite the
State's showing of the factors.5 It would be inappropriate to grant a stay
of the law "without asserting that [it] is even probably unconstitutional." 56
Four Justices dissented. Justice Breyer emphasized that a stay was
improper because keeping the district court's injunction in place "would
maintain that status quo pending the decision of this case by the Court of
Appeals."5 7 The stay, on the other hand, would "seriously disruptH that
status quo" by causing numerous clinics to close, possibly "substantially
reduc[ing] access to safe abortions elsewhere in Texas." 8 And "[t]he long-
er a given facility remains closed, the less likely it is ever to reopen" even
if the law is ultimately held unconstitutional. 9
In March 2014, the merits panel of the Fifth Circuit ultimately found
the Texas abortion laws at issue in Abbott constitutional.6 0
49. Id.
50. Planned Parenthood of Greater Tex. Surgical Health Servs. v. Abbott, 134 S. Ct. 506,
508 (2013) (Breyer, J., dissenting).
51. Tony Mauro, Appeals Court Silent on Texas Abortion Clinic Law, NAfL L.J. ONLINE,
Sept. 1, 2014.
52. Abbott, 134 S. Ct. at 508 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
53. Id. at 506 ("We may not vacate a stay entered by a court of appeals unless that court
clearly and 'demonstrably' erred in its application of 'accepted standards.' ").
54. Id. at 506-07.
55. Id. at 507.
56. Id.
57. Id. at 509 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. Planned Parenthood of Greater Tex. Surgical Health Servs. v. Abbott, 748 F.3d 583,
604-05 (5th Cir. 2014).
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2. Whole Woman's Health v. Lakey1
Deja vu happened soon after Abbott. On August 29, 2014, the same
federal district court found Texas's requirement that abortion clinics
meet the standards for ambulatory surgical centers unconstitutional. 62
The court enjoined enforcement of that requirement. 63 Two days later,
the State asked the Fifth Circuit for a stay. 64
After hearing oral argument on September 12, 2014, the Fifth Circuit
issued a partial stay of the district court's injunction on October 2,
2014.65 The Fifth Circuit found that the State was likely to succeed on
appeal in showing that the ambulatory surgical center requirements
were facially constitutional, 66 but that the State would be unlikely to
show that the same requirements were constitutional as applied to a
clinic in El Paso, Texas. 67 The Fifth Circuit cited its stay opinion in Ab-
bott to show that the State would suffer irreparable harm if unable to
enforce its law while appeal was pending, and that the public interest
would similarly suffer if the law went unenforced. 68 After the Fifth Circuit
granted the stay, thirteen abortion clinics in Texas closed overnight.6 9
The plaintiffs asked for emergency relief from the Supreme Court.
This time, the plaintiffs were successful. On October 14, 2014, the Su-
preme Court vacated the stay with respect to the ambulatory surgical
center requirements.7 0 Thus, while the appeal was pending before the
Fifth Circuit, the State of Texas could not enforce those requirements.
The opinion lacked explanation.7 1 It did note, however, that "Justice Scal-
ia, Justice Thomas, and Justice Alito would deny the application [to va-
cate the stay] in its entirety."7 2
In June 2015, the Fifth Circuit merits panel found the Texas abortion
restrictions at issue facially constitutional, but unconstitutional as ap-
61. 135 S. Ct. 399 (2014).
62. Whole Woman's Health v. Lakey, 46 F. Supp. 3d 673, 676 (W.D. Tex. 2014). The court
also enjoined the enforcement of the admitting privileges requirement as applied to specific
clinics. Id at 677.
63. Id
64. Emergency Motion to Stay Final Judgment Pending Appeal and Motion for Expedited
Consideration, Whole Women's Health v. Lakey, 769 F.3d 285 (5th Cir. 2014) (No. 14-50928),
2014 WL 4346480.
65. Lakey, 769 F.3d at 305.
66. Id at 294-300.
67. Id at 303-04.
68. Id at 305.
69. Laura Bassett, Situation in Texas Is 'Urgent' After 13 Abortion Clinics Close Over-
night, HUFFINGTON POST (Oct. 3, 2014), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2014/10/03/texas-
abortion-clinics n 5927698.html.
70. See generally Whole Woman's Health v. Lakey, 135 S. Ct. 399 (2014) (vacating the




STAYS OF INJUNCTIVE RELIEF
plied to one clinic in McAllen, Texas.7 3 The plaintiffs asked the Fifth Cir-
cuit to stay its mandate while they filed a petition for writ of certiorari
with the Supreme Court.7 4 The Fifth Circuit denied that request, with
one judge dissenting.7 5 The plaintiffs then asked for the same relief from
the Supreme Court. Justice Scalia referred the request to the entire
Court, which granted the requested relief without explanation.7 6 Chief
Justice Roberts and Justices Scalia, Thomas, and Alito voted to deny the
requested relief.7 In September 2015, the plaintiffs filed their petition
for writ of certiorari with the Court.7 8 The Court granted that petition
in November 2015.79
III. QUESTIONING THE EVALUATION OF LIKELY SUCCESS ON THE MERITS
The Court was very clear in Nken that the stay applicant must make
a "strong showing" of its likely success on appeal, and that the merits is
one of the two most critical factors considered by courts. There is little
support for this clarity, however. More specifically, there is little histori-
cal, theoretical, or practical support for the evaluation of the merits of
the appeal as part of a stay decision, especially not to the extent of its
current importance.
A. Lack of Historical Support
When the U.S. Supreme Court first addressed whether federal courts
had the power to stay injunctive relief pending appeal, it looked to Eng-
lish practice.8 0 A court's power to stay in such cases is governed "by those
principles and rules which relate to chancery proceedings exclusively. It
depends upon the effect which, according to the principles and usages of
a court of equity, an appeal has upon the proceedings and decree of the
court appealed from."8 1
73. Whole Woman's Health v. Lakey, 46 F. Supp. 3d 673 (W.D. Tex. 2014), rev'd in part sub
nom. Whole Woman's Health v. Cole, 790 F.3d 563, 567 (5th Cir. 2015). The case name changed
because at the time of this decision, David Lakey was no longer the Commissioner of the Texas
Department of State Health Services. The new Interim Commissioner is Kirk Cole.
74. Whole Woman's Health v. Cole, 790 F.3d 563 (5th Cir.), modified sub nom. Cap Hold-
ings Inc. v. Lorden, 790 F.3d 599, 599 (5th Cir. 2015).
75. Id The opinion also clarified that the injunction prohibiting enforcement of the re-
strictions on the McAllen, Texas clinic would remain in effect until October 29, 2015. Id
76. Whole Woman's Health v. Cole, 135 S. Ct. 2923 (2015).
77. Id
78. Whole Woman's Health v. Cole, 790 F.3d 563 (5th Cir. 2015), petition for cert filed, 193
L. Ed. 2d 364 (U.S. Sept. 4, 2015) (No. 15-274).
79. Whole Woman's Health v. Cole, 790 F.3d 563 (5th Cir. 2015), cert granted, 84 U.S.L.W.
31111 (U.S. Nov. 3, 2015) (No. 15-274).
80. In re Slaughter-house Cases, 77 U.S. (10 Wall.) 273, 296 (1869) ("[T]he rule is well settled in
the English courts that an appeal in chancery does not stop the proceedings under the decree from
which the appeal was taken without the special order of the subordinate court.").
81. Hovey v. McDonald, 109 U.S. 150, 160 (1883).
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The principles and rules governing English chancery proceedings are
most clearly explained in an order from the English House of Lords is-
sued in 1807. The "very ancient practice" prior to 1807 was that an ap-
peal automatically stayed proceedings in the courts of equity.8 2 But
courts of equity had not followed the practice for "a very long course of
years" and the House of Lords knew it.83 Instead, courts of equity allowed
cases to proceed despite the pending appeal. The only exception was for
cases, in which [a court of equity's] judicial discretion has induced them
upon the application of parties interested to stay . . . on account of such
Appeals." 84 In the order, the House of Lords expressly rejected the pur-
ported ancient practice of an automatic stay85 and adopted the rule that
courts of equity already followed: an appeal of a judgment from a court of
equity would not stay proceedings unless the court of equity or House of
Lords ordered such a stay.86
The order from the House of Lords also elaborates on when a stay is
appropriate. Generally, a stay is inappropriate without evidence of "con-
sequences the most oppressive to the suitors in Courts of Equity, and the
utmost inconvenience in the administration of justice in such Courts."87
82. Huguenin v. Baseley [1808] 33 Eng. Rep. 722 (HL) 723.
83. Id at 724.
84. Id.
85. Id; see, e.g., The Warden and Minor Canons of St. Pauls v. Morris [1804] 32 Eng. Rep.
624 (HL) 625 ("In deciding upon this petition I consider myself acting under the authority of the
House of Lords. The clear understanding of that House is, that the proceedings in the Court of
Chancery are not staid by an appeal.").
86. Huguenin v. Baseley [1808] 33 Eng. Rep. 722 (HL) 724.
87. Id at 724. A Treatise on the Practice of the High Court of Chancery further explained:
The Courts, however, are very unwilling to suspend the execution of decrees, and
will not do so except in cases where there is danger of the object of the appeal being
defeated, before the appeal can be heard. Where that is the case, the Court will sus-
pend the execution of a decree or order pending an appeal; thus where the object of a
demurrer is to take the opinion of the Court upon the liability of a party to make the
discovery required by the bill, the Court will suspend proceedings to enforce an an-
swer pending the appeal from an order over-ruling the demurrer.
So also, where there would be danger of irreparable mischief. In cases of injunctions,
for instance, and still more in orders dissolving injunctions, an appeal ought almost
always to be permitted to stay execution; upon this ground, likewise, where the
Court has directed the sale of property, it will suspend the sale, or where property of
a perishable nature is ordered to be delivered up, it will direct security to be given
for the amount of the property. And so where a specific performance of an agree-
ment for a sale has been decreed, it will suspend the execution of the conveyance till
after the appeal, although it will not suspend the other proceedings in the Master's
Office.
It is, however, only in cases where the mischief of allowing the proceedings to go on
will be irreparable, or will defeat the object of the appeal, that it will interfere; and,
therefore, although the Court will, as we have seen above, suspend the execution of
process to compel an answer, pending an appeal from an order over-ruling a demur-
rer, the Court will not suspend the execution of an order for the production of docu-
ments pending an appeal from that order; because, although by the operation of the
order, the evidence afforded by the documents produced will be disclosed, yet, if it is
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Thus, courts of equity and the House of Lords were directed to consider
harm to the party seeking a stay, and the effect of the lack of a stay with-
in the administration of justice.
Although not always citing the House of Lords order expressly, courts
appear to have followed this directive. The Lord Chancellor Eldon once
explained that "[t]here are very few cases of applications to stay proceed-
ings under a Decree, unless irreparable mischief may be the consequence
of proceedingH until the Appeal shall be heard."8 8
Sometimes courts discussed both harm to the applicant and whether
the appeal would be useful without a stay. The uselessness of the appeal
without a stay relates both to harm to the stay applicant-because an
appeal may become useless due to irreparable harm-and to the admin-
istration of justice-because an appellate court is wasting its time decid-
ing an appeal without meaningful effect. Examples include Wood v.
Milner'9 where the Lord Chancellor granted a stay, finding that "all the
benefit of the appeal would be goneH if the proceedings be not stayed
pending the appeal."9 0 In Garcias v. Ricardo,91 the Lord Chancellor de-
nied a stay and distinguished Wood, finding that denial of a stay would
not render the appeal useless and would not irreparably injure the de-
fendant. 92 The Lord Chancellor also denied the stay because the harm to
the plaintiff, if a stay were issued, outweighed the harm to the defendant
without a stay.93 In Storey v. Lord John George Lennox,9 4 the Lord Chan-
cellor similarly considered both the usefulness of the later appeal and the
balance of the harms. The Lord Chancellor reasoned that when "the ap-
peal will be useless if the execution of the order is not stayed, a very
strong ground for staying the execution is, no doubt, laid."95 This factor,
combined with the fact that the delay from the stay would affect the
defendant more than the plaintiff, prompted the court to issue the
stay pending appeal.9 6
Consistent with the sentiment in the House of Lords order that stays
were to be the exception, English courts often attempted to discourage
afterwards decided that the evidence ought not to have been produced, it will go for
nothing.
3 EDMUND ROBERT DANIELL, A TREATISE ON THE PRACTICE OF THE HIGH COURT OF CHANCERY
WITH SOME PRACTICE OBSERVATIONS ON THE PLEADINGS IN THAT COURT 63 (London ed. 1846).
88. Wood v. Griffith [1815] 34 Eng. Rep. 620 (HL) 620.
89. [1820] 37 Eng. Rep. 510 (HL).
90. Id at 511.
91. [1845] 60 Eng. Rep. 462 (HL).
92. Id at 463.
93. Id
94. [1836] 40 Eng. Rep. 539 (HL).
95. Id at 540.
96. Id
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applications for stays. In Huguenin v. Baseley,97 the Lord Chancellor El-
don granted the stay but expressed doubt regarding the wisdom of the
practice because "giving much encouragement to such applications will
palsy the arm of Justice."9 8 In Walburn v. Ingilby,99 the Lord Chancellor
cited Huguenin and explained that in certain cases, stays pending ap-
peals "would really amount to deciding the matter the other way" if a
stay would really "be a reversal of the decision under the form of staying
execution." 00 For this reason, applications for stays are to be "uniformly
discouraged."10 1 Although inclined to grant the stay in Walb urn, the Lord
Chancellor did not want to "giv[e] encouragement to vexatious appeals
upon a large portion of the business which occupies these Courts." 1 02 The
Lord Chancellor also lamented that stays would generally be appropriate
if appellate courts were able to "give instantaneous dispatch," but
whether that would ever be possible while still ensuring "full confidence
for its decisions" was "another and more serious question." 103
The 1807 House of Lords order did not direct consideration of the mer-
its, and some courts expressly rejected consideration of the merits. In
Wood v. Milner, the Lord Chancellor Eldon specifically noted the appro-
priateness "of not hearing the merits of appeals on motions." 10 4 He also
noted the difficulty of predicting the merits: "[t]here have been so many
cases in which I have, when at the bar, succeeded when I thought I was
not entitled, and vice versa."10 Somewhat similarly, in Walburn v. Ingil-
by,106 the Lord Chancellor denied a stay of an order of production of doc-
uments against the defendant even though he accepted that the plaintiff
would not ultimately succeed on the merits of his claim.1 07
The U.S. Supreme Court cited to this English chancery practice when
describing the power of federal courts to issue stays:
[I]t seems to be well settled everywhere, in suits in equity, that an ap-
peal from the decision of the court denying an application for an in-
junction does not operate as an injunction or stay of the proceedings
pending the appeal. Neither does an appeal from an order dissolving
an injunction."o0
97. [1808] 33 Eng. Rep. 722 (HL).
98. Id. at 723.
99. [1832] 47 Eng. Rep. 96 (HL).
100. Id. at 99.
101. Id.
102. Id. at 100.
103. Id.
104. [1820] 37 Eng. Rep. 510 (HL) 510.
105. Id at 511.
106. [1832] 47 Eng. Rep. 96 (HL).
107. Id. at 99.
108. In re Slaughter-house Cases, 77 U.S. (10 Wall.) 273, 297 (1869).
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Soon after, the Court recognized the same exception developed by English
courts of equity, allowing courts to grant a stay "if the purposes of justice
required it." 09 "This power undoubtedly exists, and should always be exer-
cised when any irremediable injury may result from the effect of the de-
cree as rendered; but it is a discretionary power."1 o This description mir-
rors English practice-instructing courts to issue a stay if irremediable
injury may occur without one.' Just as English chancery practice did not
look to the merits in deciding whether justice requires a stay, the Court
similarly did not mention the merits as relevant to the determination.
State courts' interpretations of English chancery practice similarly
did not emphasize the merits in evaluating the propriety of stays of
judgments of injunctive relief pending appeal. In Tulare Irrigation Dis-
trict v. Superior Court,1 2 the California Supreme Court discussed Eng-
lish chancery practice extensively. An appeal would not stay the lower
court's grant of injunctive relief without a finding that "irreparable dam-
age will be done to the appellant in the meantime."1 1 3 The need for irrep-
arable damage relates to the purpose of stays: "to protect [an] appellant
from having his right of appeal rendered nugatory or merely nominal if
he should succeed." 1 1 4 Relying again on English practice, the California
Supreme Court declined evaluation of the merits of the appeal." To the
contrary, it explained that it "of course, express[es] no opinion as to the
merits of the appeal."1 1 6
The Court of Errors and Appeals of New Jersey similarly refused to
evaluate the merits of an appeal when evaluating a stay.1 1 7 It explained
that the decision to issue a stay "must rest with the sound discretion of
the court."1 1 8 In exercising that discretion, a court "must look not to the
merits of the appeal so much as the circumstances of the case and the
situation of the property."119 The dissenting opinion further explained,
"the merits ought not to be heard upon this summary motion. The prac-
tice will lead unavoidably either to a decision upon a partial hearing, or
to a prejudging of the case upon its merits, in contravention of the rules
and practice of the court." 1 2 0
109. Hovey v. McDonald, 109 U.S. 150, 161 (1883).
110. Id
111. In this specific case, the Court discussed that a stay "would have been eminently proper"
because "[i]t would have protected all parties and produced injury to none." Id at 162.
112. 242 P. 725 (Cal. 1925).
113. Id at 730-31.
114. Id at 731.
115. Id at 735.
116. Id
117. See Doughty v. Somerville & Easton R.R. Co., 7 N.J. Eq. 629, 632 (N.J. 1848).
118. Id
119. Id
120. Id at 636 (Green, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
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This is not to suggest that the merits never crept into the evalua-
tion-both in English chancery courts and federal courts. For instance,
although the Lord Chancellor ignored the ultimate merits of the case in
Walburn, he did mention the relevance of the merits of the specific issue
on appeal: "unless there seems strong ground for supposing that the
judgment will be reversed, and a suggestion be made of remediless mis-
chief, the execution ought not to be suspended." 12 1 In Gwynn v. Loth-
bridge, 12 2 the Lord Chancellor Eldon similarly explained: "[T]he Court
must give a certain degree of credit to the Decree; supposing it to be
right; unless a strong ground is shewn [sic] for the contrary conclusion:
more than the mere dissatisfaction of the party appealing." 1 23 He also
considered that that the appealing party had dragged its feet, not taking
a prompt appeal, 12 4 implying a lack of irreparable injury. And in Lord v.
Co]vin, 12 5 the Vice Chancellor explained that "[w]here the Court has no
judicial doubt upon the decree, it will not in general stay proceedings." 12 6
The Court thus must "consider the nature or the question decided and
the grounds of [its] decision, and whether the case is one on which [it]
might judicially entertain a reasonable doubt." 127 Still, the merits of the
appeal do not appear to have ever been incorporated as a formal consid-
eration in English chancery practice.
Similarly, the merits crept into the evaluation in U.S. federal courts.
Even as far back as 1897, 128 a federal trial court noted the "great and ir-
reparable loss" that one party would suffer without a stay, 12 9 and ex-
plained that "[u]nder such circumstances ... it is the right and duty of
the trial court to maintain, if possible, the status quo pending an appeal,
if the questions at issue are involved in doubt." 13 0 The Supreme Court
also mentioned the merits sporadically. In 1968, Justice Douglas ex-
plained that "it is a federal policy to grant stays where a substantial
question is presented and denial of the stay will do irreparable harm to
the applicant."1 3 1
However, as with the English chancery courts, formal consideration
was not given to the merits of an appeal in U.S. courts. In 1942, in
121. Walburn v. Ingilby [1833] 39 Eng. Rep. 604, 613.
122. [1808] 33 Eng. Rep. 645 (HL).
123. Id
124. Id
125. [1861] 62 Eng. Rep. 460 (HL) (appeal taken from Scot.).
126. Id at 460.
127. Id at 461.
128. Cotting v. Kan. City Stock-Yards Co., 82 F. 850 (D. Kan. 1897).
129. Id at 857.
130. Id
131. Smith v. Ritchey, 89 S. Ct. 54, 54 (1968); see also Winters v. United States, 89 S. Ct.
57, 59 (1968) ("In federal law, a stay is granted if substantial questions are presented and if
denial of a stay may result in irreparable damage to the applicant.").
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Scripps-Howard Radio, Inc. v. FCC,13 2 the Court declined to delineate
"the criteria which should govern the Court in exercising that power" to
stay injunctive relief pending appeal,1 3 3 but irreparable injury seemed to
be the most important consideration. The Court described that the power
to stay necessarily existed to "prevent irreparable injury to the parties or
to the public resulting from the premature enforcement of a determina-
tion which may later be found to have been wrong." 13 4 Forty years later,
the same held true. In 1981, Justice Powell explained that "[t]o prevail
on an application for stay, an applicant must make a showing of a threat
of irreparable injury to interests that he properly represents."1 35 Within
this analysis, the judge must " 'balance the equities ... and determine on
which side the risk of irreparable injury weighs most heavily.' "136 Justice
Powell denied the stay finding no showing of irreparable injury-despite
also acknowledging that the applicants "raised interesting and substan-
tial questions on the merits."1 37
How, then, did the merits become a "critical" Nken factor? It can ul-
timately be traced back to a 1958 D.C. Circuit case, Virginia Petroleum
Jobbers Assn v. Federal Power Commission. 13 8 Virginia Petroleum in-
volved a request for a stay pending appeal. 13 9 Without citing to any au-
thority, the D.C. Circuit listed four factors to evaluate when granting a
stay of injunctive relief pending appeal, the same factors that later be-
came the Nken factors.1 4 0 The lack of authority is not surprising. There
was no Supreme Court precedent supporting these four factors. And the
D.C. Circuit's emphasis on the merits of the appeal was inconsistent with
English practice, 1 4 1 which the Court formerly found to be governing.
132. 316 U.S. 4 (1942).
133. Id at 17.
134. Id at 9.
135. Graddick v. Newman, 453 U.S. 928, 933 (1981).
136. Id (quoting Holtzman v. Schlesinger, 414 U.S. 1304, 1308-09 (1973)).
137. Id at 935.
138. 259 F.2d 921 (D.C. Cir. 1958); see Hilton v. Braunskill, 481 U.S. 770, 776-77 (1987)
(citing Va. Petroleum, 259 F.2d at 925). Actually, the Court cited four cases in total, two of
which- Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Commission v. Holiday Tours, Inc., and Acci-
dentFund v. Baerwaldt-also cited Virginia Petroleum. See Wash. Metro. Area Transit Comm'n
v. Holiday Tours, Inc., 559 F.2d 841, 842-44 (D.C. Cir. 1977); Accident Fund v. Baerwaldt, 579
F. Supp. 724, 725 (W.D. Mich. 1984). The fourth case cited in Hilton was Garcia-Mir v. Meese,
781 F.2d 1450 (11th Cir. 1986). Notably, Garcia-Mir described the merits factor as requiring a
showing that "the movant is likely to prevail on the merits on the appeal," which may very well
be a lesser standard than a strong showing. Id at 1453. The Hilton Court also cited Wright &
Miller's treatise on Federal Practice & Procedure, which includes these four factors. The trea-
tise explains that the "original source of this formulation is" Virginia Petroleum. 11 WRIGHT ET
AL., supra note 7, § 2904, at 501.
139. Va. Petroleum, 259 F.2d at 923.
140. Id at 925.
141. Current English Civil Procedure Rule 52.7 continues the traditional rule-that "unless
the appeal court or the lower court orders otherwise[,] . . . an appeal shall not operate as a stay
of any order or decision of the lower court." CPR 52.7. Current practice is to apply this rule to
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Regardless, the D.C. Circuit created these four factors in Virginia Pe-
troleum. The Supreme Court later cited Virginia Petroleum and
the four factors in Hilton v. Braunskill,4 2 and re-affirmed them as
controlling in Nken.
Put simply, where did the Nken "strong showing that he is likely to suc-
ceed on the merits" factor come from? 143 Not from anywhere authoritative.
B. Lack of Theoretical Support
Although there has been little academic commentary about the purpos-
es of stays pending appeal, courts have described their purposes. The theo-
retical purposes have all related to providing meaningful judicial review.
There is no need for courts to evaluate the merits to provide that meaning-
ful judicial review, much less to evaluate whether the applicant has made
a "strong showing" of likely success on the merits of the appeal. 144
The Supreme Court has extensively discussed the need for stays to
ensure meaningful judicial review. In 1942, in Scripps-Howard Radio,
Inc. v. FC,145 the Supreme Court explained:
No court can make time stand still. The circumstances surrounding
a controversy may change irrevocably during the pendency of an ap-
peal, despite anything a court can do . . . . It has always been held,
therefore, that as part of its traditional equipment for the administra-
any type of judgment, legal or equitable. "Whether the court should exercise its discretion to
grant a stay will depend upon all the circumstances of the case, but the essential question is
whether there is a risk of injustice to one or other or both parties if it grants or refuses a stay.
In particular, if a stay is refused what are the risks of the appeal being stifled?" Hammond
Suddard Solicitors v. Agrichem Int'l Holdings Ltd. [2001] EWCA (Civ) 2065.
142. 48 U.S. 770, 776 (1987).
143. Id To be fair, it seems that the merits had been announced formally as relevant to
stays pending certiorari review prior to 1987. The standards used by the individual Justices are
not defined and have had to be pieced together from in-chambers opinions, which were not even
published until 1926. Lois J. Scali, Prediction-Making in the Supreme Court: The Granting of
Stays by Individual Justices, 32 UCLA L. REV. 1020, 1030-31 (1985). Generally speaking, the
individual Justices used the factors delineated by Justice Brennan in 1980. Rostker v. Goldberg,
448 U.S. 1306 (1980). He described the merits as relevant-requiring the applicant to show a "
,reasonable probability' that four Justices will consider the issue sufficiently meritorious to
grant certiorari or to note probable jurisdiction," and showing "a fair prospect that a majority of
the Court will conclude that the decision below was erroneous." Id at 1308 (quoting Graves v.
Barnes, 405 U.S. 1201, 1203-04 (1972)). Even after Rostker though, some opinions by individual
Justices "address all four prongs of the Rostker test, while others focus on only one." Scali, su-
pra, at 1032. The full Court later cited to the Rostker test for "obtain[ing] a stay pending the
filing and disposition of a petition for a writ of certiorari" in Holingsworth v Perry, 558 U.S.
183, 190 (2010). Presumably, after Hollingsworth, there should be less variation in the stand-
ards used for emergency motions to stay pending certiorari review.
144. This Article addresses only the Nken standards for relief pending appeal, not the
standards for relief pending review of petition for certiorari. Some of the arguments in this Sec-
tion would likely not apply as well if a petition for certiorari were pending. Changing circum-
stances may be a reason the Court wants to deny certiorari. Also, review via certiorari is discre-
tionary, meaning the litigant does not have the same interest in judicial review as she does in a
direct appeal.
145. 316 U.S. 4 (1942).
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tion of justice, a federal court can stay the enforcement of a judgment
pending the outcome of an appeal. 146
Without a stay, review on appeal "would be an idle ceremony if the situa-
tion were irreparably changed before the correction could be made." 147
The Court repeated the same sentiment in Nken. "It takes time to de-
cide a case on appeal." 148 But "if a court takes the time it needs, the
court's decision may in some cases come too late for the party seeking
review." 149 Because of the time delay, stays are "justified by the perceived
need 'to prevent irreparable injury to the parties or to the public' pending
review."15 0 It is impossible to make time stand still to prevent that irrep-
arable injury. But it is possible to issue a stay to "hold a ruling in abey-
ance to allow an appellate court the time necessary to review it.""'1 In-
deed, "[t]he whole idea is to hold the matter under review in abeyance
because the appellate court lacks sufficient time to decide the merits." 15 2
146. Id at 9-10 (footnote omitted).
147. Id at 10; see also Doughty v. Somerville & Easton R.R. Co., 7 N.J. Eq. 629, 630 (1848)
("It would be worse than useless for us to hear the merits of the appeal argued, and to decide
thereon three or six months after the evil complained of has been suffered to be committed, and
has become irremediable or the injury irreparable.").
148. Nkenv. Holder, 556 U.S. 418, 421 (2009).
149. Id
150. Id at 432 (quoting Scripps-Howard Radio, 316 U.S. at 9).
151. Id at 421. This described purpose of stays also relates to the originating authority for
courts to issue stays, to issue writs to maintain jurisdiction. See supra note 7 and accompanying
text; see also, e.g., Whitney Nat'l. Bank in Jefferson Parish v. Bank of New
Orleans & Tr. Co., 379 U.S. 411, 426 (1965) (explaining that the lower court of appeal's power to
issue a stay and "protect its jurisdiction is beyond question"); Mesabi Iron Co. v. Reserve Mining
Co., 268 F.2d 782, 783 (8th Cir. 1959) ("[I]t is unnecessary to stayproceedings in this
case, pending these appeals, in aid of or to protect the jurisdiction of this Court or to insure the
effectiveness of whatever judgments may eventually be entered."); Plomb Tool Co. v. Fayette R.
Plumb, Inc., 171 F.2d 945, 946-47 (9th Cir. 1949) (issuing a stay "to preserve defendant's bene-
fits and fruits of appeal and to preserve this court's appellate jurisdiction"). If the circumstances
make the situation irrevocable, the appeal is moot and the appellate court loses its jurisdiction.
See, e.g., S.F. Residence Club, Inc. v. 7027 Old Madison Pike, LLC, 583 F.3d 750, 756 (11th Cir.
2009) (dismissing appeal as moot because appellant failed to seek a stay precluding payment of
funds to a third-party creditor); In re AOV Indus., 792 F.2d 1140, 1147 (D.C. Cir. 1986) (discuss-
ing that if a stay is not secured, it is likely that an appeal will become moot); Am. Grain Ass'n v.
Lee-Vac, Ltd., 630 F.2d 245, 248 (5th Cir. 1980) (dismissing appeal as moot because property
had been disbursed when appellant failed to secure a stay pending appeal); Providence Journal
Co. v. FBI, 595 F.2d 889, 890 (1st Cir. 1979) ("Appellants' right of appeal here will become moot
unless the stay is continued pending determination of the appeals.").
152. Nken, 556 U.S. at 432 (emphasis added). Courts often equate providing time and main-
taining the status quo as necessary to enable the appellate court to decide the appeal. See, e.g.,
In re CGI Indus., 27 F.3d 296, 299 (7th Cir. 1994) ("The request for a stay of the sale order is
not simply another formality to be observed in perfecting an appeal. A stay serves to maintain
the status quo pending appeal, thereby preserving the ability of the reviewing court to offer a
remedy and holding at bay the reliance interests in the judgment that otherwise militate
against reversal of the sale."); Mesabi Iron Co., 268 F.2d at 783 ("This Court, in view of Rule
62(g) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 28 U.S.C.A., has, we think, power to stay proceed-
ings pending appeal and 'to make any order appropriate to preserve the status quo or the effec-
tiveness of the judgment subsequently to be entered.' " (quoting FED. R. Civ. P. 62(g))); Al-
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Stays are essentially "a means of ensuring that appellate courts can
responsibly fulfill their role in the judicial process."1 53 Without a stay,
judicial review could become practically meaningless. The appellate court
may reverse the trial court, but the circumstances have already changed
to the extent that the reversal has little effect. But with a stay, the cir-
cumstances cannot change and the reversal can have a meaningful, prac-
tical effect. Without that meaningful effect, the appellate court's role in
the judicial process is denigrated.
Meaningless appellate decisions not only denigrate the appellate
court's role, but also the individual's right to judicial review. "The inter-
est of the [stay applicant] is largely the same as that of the general pub-
lic in having legal questions decided on the merits, as correctly and ex-
peditiously as possible"; 15 4 the Supreme Court said the same in Nken.15
The interest in having "cases independently reviewed by an appellate
tribunal" is derived both from "the Constitution and laws." 1 6 That inter-
est is only fulfilled, however, if the appellate review is meaningful, mean-
ing that the appellate court can "take a fresh look at the decision of the
trial court before [the decision] becomes irrevocable."1 57 Denying a stay
and allowing the circumstances to become irrevocable is "to deny the
right of appeal in the case; for if we have no power to protect the subject
matter of the appeal, then is the right nugatory."1 8
Individuals value the process of meaningful review itself. Obviously,
the parties wish to win the appeal, but there is also "value in permitting
individuals to directly participate in the adjudication of their rights."1 9
Similarly, participation in full judicial review " 'generate[s] the feeling,
so important to a popular government, that justice has been done.' "160
Justice has not been done if rights are practically adjudicated by circum-
Shareef v. Bush, No. 05-2458, 2006 WL 3544736, at *1 (D.D.C. Dec. 8, 2006) ("A primary pur-
pose of a stay pending resolution of issues on appeal is to preserve the status quo among the
parties.").
153. Nken, 556 U.S. at 427.
154. Wash. Metro. Area Transit Comm'n v. Holiday Tours, Inc., 559 F.2d 841, 843 (D.C. Cir.
1977).
155. Nken, 556 U.S. at 427 (comparing the public's interest in judicial review to the public's
interest in the enforcement of laws).
156. Providence Journal Co. v. Fed. Bureau of Investigation, 595 F.2d 889, 890 (1st Cir.
1979).
157. Id; see also id ("Failure to grant a stay will entirely destroy appellants' rights to se-
cure meaningful review.").
158. Doughty v. Somerville & Easton R.R. Co., 7 N.J. Eq. 629, 630 (1848).
159. Martin H. Re dish & William J. Katt, Taylor v. Sturgell, Procedural Due Process, and
the Day-in-Court Ideal: Resolving the Virtual Representation Dilemma, 84 NOTRE DAME L. REV.
1877, 1889 (2009).
160. Martin H. Redish & Lawrence C. Marshall, Adjudicatory Independence and the Values
of Procedural Due Process, 95 YALE L.J. 455, 483 (1986) (quoting Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee
Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 171-72 (1951) (Frankfurter, J., concurring)).
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stances changing within the (usually long) time it takes the appellate
court to decide the appeal.
Given these purposes of stays pending appeal-ensuring meaningful
review to protect the courts' role and the parties' interests-it is not ap-
propriate to evaluate the likely result on the merits in issuing a stay, es-
pecially not to the extent contemplated by Nken.1 6 1 It matters little who
will actually win the appeal. What matters is that the appellate court's
ruling will have meaning for society and the individuals.
Is there any purpose for or theory of stays supporting consideration of
the merits? It is difficult to know from the case law. Although courts ea-
gerly explain the purposes of stays, they do not explain why considera-
tion of the merits is consistent with those purposes. The D.C. Circuit
came close in Virginia Petroleum: "Without such a substantial indication
of probable success, there would be no justification for the court's intru-
sion into the ordinary processes of administration and judicial review." 162
True, stays disrupt the ordinary process of injunctive judgments being
immediately enforceable. But stays do not disrupt the ordinary processes
of judicial review, that is, appellate judicial review. To the contrary,
stays are necessary to ensure the ordinary process of judicial review-to
ensure the appellate court's ability to conduct meaningful judicial review
without the circumstances irrevocably changing in the meantime.
Another possible reason why consideration of the merits might be
proper is borrowed from academic literature concerning preliminary in-
junctions. Professor John Leubsdorf first presented the now dominant
theory guiding the factors used to evaluate preliminary injunctive relief:
"to minimize the probable irreparable loss of rights caused by errors in-
cident to hasty decision." 1 63 Given the theoretical purpose, Professor
161. Daniel M. Gonen, Judging in Chambers: The Powers ofa Single Justice of the Supreme
Court, 76 U. CIN. L. REV. 1159, 1187 (2008) ("[T]he likelihood of reversal should not factor in at
all" when the purpose of interim relief is to "keep[] a case in a posture in which it may be re-
viewed by an appellate court.").
162. Va. Petroleum Jobbers Ass'n v. Fed. Power Comm'n, 259 F.2d 921, 925 (D.C. Cir. 1958).
Numerous other courts have used this same language. See, e.g., Ambach v. Bell, 686 F.2d 974,
987-88 (D.C. Cir. 1982); Friendship Edison Pub. Charter Sch. Collegiate Campus v. Nesbitt, 704
F. Supp. 2d 50, 52 (D.D.C. 2010); Advanta Bank v. FDIC, 684 F. Supp. 2d 17, 25 (D.D.C. 2010);
Citizens for Responsibility & Ethics in Wash. v. Office of Admin., 593 F. Supp. 2d 156, 160
(D.D.C. 2009); Goss v. Martin (In re Goss), No. 05-70378, 2008 WL 824303, at *2 (E.D. Okla.
Mar. 26, 2008); Hubbard v. United States, 496 F. Supp. 2d 194, 198 (D.D.C. 2007); Apotex Inc.
v. FDA, 508 F. Supp. 2d 78, 82 (D.D.C. 2007). In Nken, the Supreme Court agreed that a stay is
"an 'intrusion into the ordinary processes of administration and judicial review.' " Nken v. Hold-
er, 556 U.S. 418, 427 (2009) (quoting Va. Petroleum, 259 F.2d at 925). It used this language,
however, to explain why stays are not available as a matter of right-not to explain why the
merits must be evaluated.
163. John Leubsdorf, The Standard for Preliminary Injunctions, 91 HARv. L. REV. 525, 540-
41 (1978); see also Thomas R. Lee, Preliminary Injunctions and the Status Quo, 58 WASH. &
LEE L. REV. 109, 154 (2001) (explaining that Professor Leubsdorfs approach has "emerged as
the triumphant, dominant theory of preliminary injunctions"); id at 157 (explaining that the
conceptual goal of minimizing the harm that could result from an erroneous decision is "now
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Leusbdorf specifically criticized the idea of disregarding the merits. "[I]f
courts dispense injunctions without regard to the merits, plaintiffs who
are in the wrong will be just as likely to secure relief as those who have
rights." 1 64 The same could be true for stays pending appeal 16 5-a state
may be able to still enforce a law pending appeal, even though the law
may likely be unconstitutional, hurting citizens' rights. Stays, however,
are not really about the parties' legal rights in the meantime; a stay or-
der actually says nothing about the parties' legal rights. Instead, a stay
"operates upon the judicial proceeding itself" by "temporarily suspending
the source of authority to act-the order or judgment in question."1 66
Regardless, both of the possible reasons why consideration of the mer-
its might be proper are inconsistent with the purposes of stays. They
overlook the need to preserve the appellate court's role to decide the ap-
peal (regardless of which way the court rules). They also overlook the
importance of providing meaningful judicial review to parties (again, re-
gardless of which way the court rules). In order to fulfill these purposes,
an appellate court must be able to disrupt the ordinary processes of the
appeal and to risk the improper deprivation of rights in the meantime.
Without this disruption and deprivation, the appellate court's ultimate
ruling will likely have limited practical effect. The merits panel in Abbott
declared Texas's abortion restrictions constitutional. 167 That merits rul-
ing should be the reason clinics in Texas closed-because the appellate
court declared the laws constitutional after providing the opponents
meaningful judicial review. But the clinics had practically closed, and
prevalent in the courts' opinions" and "finds almost no detractors or competitors in the academy
or in federal jurisprudence").
164. Leubsdorf, supra note 163, at 547.
165. Professor Leubsdorf did not apply his theory to stays pending appeal. Id at 527.
166. Nken, 556 U.S. at 428-29. The Court explained how a preliminary injunction functions
differently: it "is a means by which a court tells someone what to do or not to do" and it "directs
the conduct of a party." Id at 428. This difference also likely relates to the different originating
authorities for stays and preliminary injunctions. Compare Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 13, 1
Stat. 73 (basing power to stay pending appeal in the need to maintain a court's jurisdiction),
with id § 11 (providing authority to decide "all suits . . . in equity," which creates the power to
issue preliminary injunctions, without referring to the need to preserve a court's jurisdiction).
Some of these arguments about the purposes of stays pending appeal in this section also ap-
ply to preliminary injunctions, thus providing an argument that the merits should not be con-
sidered in granting preliminary injunctive relief either. See, e.g, In re Microsoft Corp. Antitrust
Litig., 333 F.3d 517, 525 (4th Cir. 2003) ("The traditional office of a preliminary injunction is to
protect the status quo and to prevent irreparable harm during the pendency of a lawsuit ulti-
mately to preserve the court's ability to render a meaningful judgment on the merits."); Repub-
lic of Phil. v. Marcos, 818 F.2d 1473, 1480 (9th Cir. 1987) ("The purpose of a preliminary injunc-
tion is to preserve the court's power to render meaningful relief after a trial on the merits.");
Matzke v. Block, 542 F. Supp. 1107, 1113 (D. Kan. 1982) ("The purpose of a preliminary injunc-
tion is two-fold: it protects the plaintiff from irreparable injury and it preserves the court's abil-
ity to decide the case on the merits."). This Article, however, takes no position on the propriety
of evaluating the merits within the preliminary injunction context.
167. Planned Parenthood of Greater Tex. Surgical Health Servs. v. Abbott, 748 F.3d 583,
604-05 (5th Cir. 2014).
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were unlikely to reopen, long before the merits decision was released.
Really, it did not matter what the merits panel decided.
C. Practical Problems
History and theory do not support the extent to which courts current-
ly evaluate the merits when deciding stay applications, nor is the evalua-
tion practical. It is awkward for district courts to evaluate the merits a
second time. Further, all courts may have the natural tendency to de-
termine the merits consistent with the initial prediction, even though the
initial prediction was not made under circumstances conducive to accu-
rate decisionmaking.
1. General Awkwardness
With some exceptions, the Federal Rules require an applicant to first
ask the district court for a stay.16 8 Applying Nken means evaluating
whether the applicant is likely to be successful on appeal, which is the
same as asking the district court whether it is likely to get reversed on
appeal. Hopefully, no district court will likely think that the decision it
just made, and that it dwelled on, is likely to be reversed. 169 Even if the
district court has some thought that the decision could be reversed, sure-
ly it believes that its decision is correct to the extent that it would be un-
able to conclude that the applicant has made a "strong showing" of its
likelihood of success on the merits of the appeal.1 7 0
168. FED. R. APP. P. 8(a)(1).
169. For this reason, the Fifth Circuit explained that the Rules do not require the movant
"to establish that the appeal would probably be successful." Ruiz v. Estelle, 650 F.2d 555, 565
(5th Cir. 1981). If that was what is required, "the Rule would not require-as it does-a prior
presentation to the district judge whose order is being appealed. That judge has already decided
the merits of the legal issue." Id But see Nken, 556 U.S. at 434 (requiring a strong showing of a
likelihood of success on the merits).
170. See, e.g., Frank v. Walker, 17 F. Supp. 3d 837, 890-91 (E.D. Wis. 2014) ("[T]he law
applicable to such claims is unsettled, and thus I acknowledge that the defendants have some
likelihood of success on the merits. However, . . . I conclude that their likelihood of success on
the merits is low."). Plus, even if the district court believes that it could be reversed on appeal, it
is still awkward for the district court to admit so. As Judge Posner revealed, " 'judges are not
comfortable' writing opinions that reveal doubt." Michael L. Wells, "Sociological Legitimacy" in
Supreme Court Opinions, 64 WASH & LEE L. REV. 1011, 1038 (2007) (quoting Richard A. Posner,
Judges' Writing Styles (And Do They Matter?), 62 U. CHI L. REV. 1421, 1441 (1995)). Courts
may also be motivated by a desire to achieve public acceptance, a phenomenon called "sociologi-
cal legitimacy." Scholars have suggested "the Justices [may] try to tamp down controversy and
encourage public acceptance by making the outcome seem ineluctable rather than problematic,
no matter how close the case may be." Id at 1039.
Despite the awkwardness, some district courts obviously do issue stays pending appeal. But
when they do, it may very well be for a reason other than genuinely believing that it decided the
merits incorrectly. See infra Section IV.C (arguing that the courts that stayed enjoinment of
various states' bans on same-sex marriage likely did not believe that the state would prevail on
the merits).
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2. Lock-in Effect
Another reason exists why the district court is unlikely to change its
mind when evaluating the likely merits for the purposes of the stay. That
reason is an economic and psychological concept called the "lock-in ef-
fect." Generally, the lock-in effect "refers to the extent that the decision
maker is less likely to change her decision . . . than she would have been
if she never were asked to make the initial decision."1 7 1 The reason for
this natural inclination is "the tendency to want to justify the initial allo-
cation of resources by confirming that the initial decision was correct." 17 2
Obviously, an initial decisionmaker "can and does change her mind some
of the time," but the self-justification motivation, along with other cogni-
tive processes, create the natural inclination to make the later decision
match the initial one. 1 7 3
Professor Kevin J. Lynch recently explored how lock-in could affect a
court's decision on the merits after deciding a preliminary injunction. 17 4
He concluded that the district court may be inclined to make its ultimate
ruling on the merits match the preliminary injunction to justify the pre-
liminary injunction. 1 75 More specifically, if a district court declines to en-
ter preliminary relief, enabling purported irreparable injury to occur, the
district court will be inclined to make the decision on the merits match
the preliminary decision-to justify the irreparable harm that occurred
in the meantime. 1 7 6 The effect of this may be that a plaintiff is more like-
ly to ultimately succeed on the merits if it sought no preliminary relief,
as opposed to unsuccessfully seeking preliminary relief. 177
171. Lynch, supra note 33, at 783. Professor Lynch explained that the idea of lock-in "origi-
nated in the literature on investment decisions, but the effect has also been studied in relation
to hiring decisions, performance appraisal, auctions, technology formats, and policy decisions.
Some other names for the lock-in effect include escalating commitment, entrapment, or sunk
costs." Id at 784 (footnotes omitted).
172. Id at 783.
173. Id Professor Lynch further explores the cognitive processes that cause lock-in. Id at
784-89. Two of these include confirmation bias, which is the tendency to interpret new evidence
consistent with a prior decision, and cognitive dissonance, which is the natural inclination to
reduce any inconsistencies between what is known and what is later learned. Id at 788.
174. Id at 804-05.
175. Id Professor Leubsdorf was less concerned about the possible lock-in effect. "That
judges do not change their views during the course of a case may demonstrate only that the
same judge will decide the same case in the same way. To the extent that prejudice is a danger,
encouraging judges to announce the plaintiffs chances of success without thoroughly consider-
ing the merits may actually enhance it. More detailed analysis at the interlocutory stage would
help the losing party avoid or rebut the judge's tentative views at the final trial." Leubsdorf,
supra note 163, at 547.
176. Lynch, supra note 33, at 804; see also id at 806 ("The judge is under significant pres-
sure to justify the earlier decision that allowed the irreparable harm to occur.").
177. Id at 804; see also id at 806 ("[A]ccording to lock-in theory, a judge might be less likely
to ultimately find for a plaintiff after allowing some irreparable harm to occur."). Notably, Pro-
fessor Lynch did not advocate eliminating consideration of the merits, as this Article does. See
id at 810-11 (explaining that the likelihood of success should still be considered, but that the
extent of success a movant would need to show should be a "low level").
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Professor Lynch's main focus was preliminary injunctions, but he also
mentioned that lock-in could occur within a stay of a decision pending
appeal."1 8 That is especially true at the district court level, where the ef-
fect could happen between the initial merits decision to issue injunctive
relief and the later decision whether to stay that injunction pending ap-
peal. The district court obviously has "psychological connectedness" to
the initial decision because it made it. The district court is unlikely to
find that the stay applicant is likely to succeed on the merits of the ap-
peal simply to justify the time and resources spent in reaching the initial
decision on the merits.
If the district court decides the merits and the appellate court decides
the stay, the concerns about lock-in diminish greatly. Plainly, the appel-
late judges did not decide the merits. There is still some level of psycho-
logical connectedness given the appellate court's natural inclination to
affirm if possible (and thus conclude that the stay applicant is not likely
to succeed on the merits of the appeal)." 9 But "[a]ppellate judges are fa-
miliar with reviewing trial court decisions for error, and they would not
be expected to face the same self-justification pressures as the judge who
initially decided the merits."18 0
The concern about lock-in re-emerges at the appellate level, however,
between the appellate court's decision on the stay and the appellate
court's later decision on the merits of the appeal. A motions panel of ap-
pellate judges decides the stay and a merits panel of appellate judges
later decides the merits. The merits appellate judges could feel the eco-
nomic and psychological need to make the merits decision match what-
ever the motions panel concluded regarding the likelihood of reversal.
More specifically, if the motions panel denied the stay and allowed some
irreparable injury to occur in the meantime, the merits panel would be
inclined to agree with the motions panel's prediction of the merits to jus-
tify that irreparable injury.
One might think that the concern about lock-in should diminish be-
cause different judges could decide the stay and the merits. No federal
appellate circuit prohibits judges who serve on the motions panel for a
case from also serving on the merits panel of the same case.18 1 Some cir-
178. Id at 795-96. In fact, a quote about preliminary injunctions to which Professor Lynch
often refers was actually directed to stays pending appeal. In discussing the time pressures and
difficulty of deciding the merits before the case is fully developed, Professor Lynch quoted from
the Supreme Court: "[t]he choice for a reviewing court should not be between justice on the fly
or participation in what may be an 'idle ceremony.' " Id at 800 (quoting Nken v. Holder, 556
U.S. 418, 427 (2009)). The Supreme Court originally said this in Scrpps-Howard and repeated
it in Nken, both of which were obviously about stays pending appeal.
179. Id at 819 n. 173.
180. Id at 819.
181. The circuits generally have different rules about how judges are assigned to merits and
motions panels. The Ninth Circuit, for example, assigns judges to motions panels for a one-
month term on a rotating basis. CIR. ADVISORY COMM., NINTH CIR. R. App. P., 27-1 § 3(b) (2015).
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cuits actually encourage it. In the Fourth Circuit, for example, "[e]very
effort is made to assign cases for oral argument to judges who have had
previous involvement with the case on appeal through random assign-
ment to a pre-argument motion," although such an assignment is not
guaranteed. 1 82 A similar provision exists in the D.C. Circuit's Rules and
Operating Procedures:
From time to time in deciding motions, the special [motions] panel may
have considered in great detail a matter that is closely related to the
merits of a case; this consideration may have included oral argument.
If that panel determines that judicial efficiency would be served by the
panel retaining the case, it will so advise the Clerk. The special panel
then controls the case from that point on to disposition. 183
Thus, not only do federal appellate circuits lack rules to prevent lock-
in, some circuits have rules that facilitate the same judges deciding both
a motion for stay and the merits.
In Abbott, two of the same Fifth Circuit judges who served on the mo-
tions panel also served on the case's merits panel. 1 84 As Nken dictates,
the motions panel evaluated the likelihood that the State would succeed
on appeal in showing that the abortion laws at issue were constitutional.
In fact, almost three-fourths of the twenty-page opinion focused on the
merits.1 85 Although the Abbott motions panel clarified that its determina-
tions "do not bind the merits panel,"1 8 6 the merits panel frequently cited
the motions panel's findings on the merits. 1 87 The motions panels and
Judges are assigned to merits panels randomly by computer. Id But see generally Adam S.
Chilton & Marin K. Levy, Challenging the Randomness of Panel Assignment in the Federal
Courts of Appeals, 101 CORNELL L. REV. 1 (2015) (questioning the untested assumption that
federal judges are randomly assigned to panels).
182. 4TH CIR. INTERNAL OPERATING P. 34.1 (2015). Similarly, in the Seventh Circuit, if a
motions panel determines that an appeal should be decided on an expedited basis, "it may rec-
ommend to the chief judge that the matter be assigned for argument and decision to the same
panel." 7TH CIR. INTERNAL OPERATING P. 6(d) (2014).
183. D.C. CIR. HANDBOOK OF PRACTICE AND INTERNAL P. X.E.1 (2016).
184. Compare Planned Parenthood of Greater Tex. Surgical Health Sers. v. Abbott, 734
F.3d 406, 409 (5th Cir. 2013) (before Circuit Judges Owen, Elrod, and Haynes), with Planned
Parenthood of Greater Tex. Surgical Health Sers. v. Abbott, 748 F.3d 583, 586 (5th Cir. 2014)
(before Circuit Judges Jones, Elrod, and Haynes). Judge Owen wrote the motions panel opinion.
Abbott, 734 F.3d at 409. Judge Jones wrote the merits panel opinion. Abbott, 748 F.3d at 586.
Only one judge overlapped on the motions and merits panel in Lakey. Compare Whole
Woman's Health v. Lakey, 769 F.3d 285, 288 (5th Cir. 2014) (before Circuit Judges Smith, El-
rod, and Higginson) with Whole Woman's Health v. Cole, 790 F.3d 563, 566 (5th Cir. 2015) (be-
fore Circuit Judges Prado, Elrod, and Haynes). Judge Elrod wrote the motions panel stay deci-
sion. Lakey, 769 F.3d at 288. The merits panel decision does not indicate its author. Cole, 790
F.3d at 566.
185. See supra notes 45-46 and accompanying text.
186. Abbott, 734 F.3d at 419.
187. For instance, the merits panel cited to the motions panels findings that traveling 150
miles to obtain an abortion is not an undue burden, doctors would be able to obtain admitting
privileges, and other factors reduced abortion access in the Rio Grande Valley. See Abbott, 748
F.3d at 598-99.
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merits panels in Whole Woman's Health even referred and cited to the
Abbott stay decision as "Abbott I" and the Abbott merits decision as
"Abbott I," as if they had the same stature.1 8 8 Regardless, consider what
had occurred between Abbott I and Abbott II-after the Fifth Circuit
granted the stay, almost half of all abortion clinics closed in Texas. The
later finding of the merits panel, which did reverse the lower court as the
motions panel predicted, justified those (early) closures.
Lock-in would be less concerning if there was little chance of error in
the initial decision by the motions panel. But the chance of error is sig-
nificant simply due to the circumstances. Those circumstances include a
lack of familiarity with the case,1 8 9 less than full appellate briefing, and
possibly no hearing, all within a "compressed timeframe not conducive to
deliberate decision-making." 9 0 Procedural mechanisms, like briefing and
oral argument, empower the "individual's opportunity to argue his case
effectively,"19 1 and help ensure "the substantively correct outcome actual-
ly issues." 1 92 These mechanisms are not in place for stays, but a motions
panel must still determine whether the stay applicant made a "strong
showing" that he is likely to succeed on the merits of the appeal.1 93 Fur-
ther complicating the decision are the many appellate cases that "raise
tough issues, turn on choices between conflicting social goals, and could
go either way." 19 4 But Nken requires that the appellate court decide who
is likely to succeed in the appeal-and do so quickly.195 These conditions
and the complexity of the issues increase the chances of error in the stay
decision, which makes it all the more problematic that the merits panel
188. Lakey, 769 F.3d at 290; Cole, 790 F.3d at 580.
189. See Cumberland Tel. & Tel. Co. v. La. Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 260 U.S. 212, 219 (1922)
("[T]he court which is best and most conveniently able to exercise the nice discretion needed to
determine this balance of convenience is the one which has considered the case on its merits,
and therefore is familiar with the record.").
190. Lynch, supra note 33, at 800.
191. Redish & Marshall, supra note 160, at 476.
192. Lawrence B. Solum, Procedural Justice, 78 S. CAL. L. REV. 181, 244 (2004).
193. Again, this is a high burden, possibly akin to the same ultimate burden of proof on
appeal. See Lynch, supra note 33, at 782.
194. Wells, supra note 170, at 1037.
195. One solution would be to extend the timeframe. That does not work so well, however,
when irreparable harm could be occurring in the meantime. Numerous things could happen
while the appellate court takes the time to decide the stay that would preclude the later deci-
sion on the merits from having meaning. A longer timeframe would also create other questions
about the timing of appeals. In Lakey, the state first requested a stay on August 31, 2014, and
the court ruled on this request on October 2, 2014. Supra notes 64-65. Before the court's ruling,
the parties filed briefs and the court held oral argument. The Fifth Circuit's opinion was over
thirty pages, and the vast majority of it focused on the merits. Is it judicially inefficient to allow
such an extensive motions procedure that ultimately turns on the merits and then later, again
decide the merits? Secondarily, the Lakey motions panels timeframe may have been long for a
motion to stay, but it was much quicker than the usual timeframe for an appellate court's deci-
sion on the merits. If the motions panel in Lakey is able to evaluate the merits so (relatively)
quickly, why do merits panels take so long to decide the merits?
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may be naturally inclined to agree with it to justify any irreparable inju-
ry that occurred in the meantime. 1 9 6
None of this is to suggest that merits panels have never ruled differ-
ently than the motions panels initially predicted; this Article does not
purport to present empirical findings about the rates at which motions
and merits panels disagree.1 97 Certainly, even if the same judges sit on
both panels, they can change their minds.1 9 8 But, the natural inclination
will be for the merits panel's decision to match the motions panel's pre-
diction. And thus, a litigant who does not seek a stay may be better off at
the merits stage than a litigant who unsuccessfully seeks a stay (even
though the appeal may also be moot at that point).
D. So What Should Be Considered?
History, theory, and practicalities do not support the consideration of
the merits of the appeal when determining whether to stay injunctive
relief pending that appeal. Based on history, theory, and practicality,
what then should be considered? The answer is basically the other three
Nken factors with some minor alterations.
The first factor should be whether the circumstances could change in
such a way as to render the appeal useless. This was an important con-
196. The procedural safeguards of a full appellate record, complete briefing, and oral argu-
ments would still exist at the merits stage of the appeal. Still, that natural tendency to agree
with the motions panel will be present. And "procedural safeguards are of no real value ... if
the decisionmaker bases his findings on factors other than his assessment of the evidence before
him." Redish & Marshall, supra note 160, at 476.
197. Only one such empirical study appears to exist. See Fatma Marouf et al., Justice on the
Fly The Danger of Errant Deportations, 75 OHIO ST. L.J. 337 (2014). After analyzing the de-
fined immigration case sample data, the authors concluded "when we view the circuit courts as
a whole, those who win their appeal are almost as likely to have had their stay request denied
as granted." Id at 382. The authors caution that "[b]ust because a court denies a stay to a peti-
tioner who ultimately prevails does not mean that court made an error in adjudicating the mo-
tion for stay." Id at 384. The prediction of the merits is only one of the four Nken factors, but it
is an important one. Id The authors conclude: "[W]hile denying a stay ... to a petitioner who
ultimately prevails is not necessarily an 'error' in light of the four-part test, we believe that a
pattern of consistently denying stays to a large number of petitioners who ultimately prevail
flags a problem with the process and raises serious questions about judges' abilities to predict,
with a reasonable level of accuracy, which cases are likely to succeed." Id at 385.
198. An obvious example of this is panel rehearings. Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 40
allows parties a rehearing by the same three judges who made the initial merits decision. FED.
R. APP. P. 40. To seek this, the litigant must "state with particularity each point of law or fact
that the petitioner believes the court has overlooked or misapprehended." Id at (a)(2). Judge
Arnold of the Eighth Circuit once explained that judges do not like petitions for rehearing for
one "obvious" reason: "People don't like to be told that they are wrong." Richard S. Arnold, Why
Judges Don't Like Petitions for Rehearing, 3 J. APp. PRAC. & PROCESS 29, 37 (2001). Still,
"[o]nce in a great while, however, people, including judges, can be brought to admit that they
were wrong." Id The chances of obtaining panel rehearing are low: "The Federal Circuit, for
example, from its inception in 1982 through 1998, granted an average of about 3.1% of petitions
for panel rehearing." Id at 29. So, very few judges vote to grant panel rehearing. Importantly,
even if rehearing is granted, it does not mean the judges will change their ultimate ruling. So,
panel rehearings are not a perfect example of a practice inconsistent with lock-in.
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sideration for English courts. It is also consistent with the predominant
purpose of stays-maintaining appellate courts' abilities to render deci-
sions that are meaningful to the parties. This factor may not be all that
much different than the current consideration of irreparable injury; usu-
ally injury is irreparable because it cannot be undone on appeal. At the
same time, it may not be useful to think of this solely as traditional ir-
reparable injury given current, defined precedent on what constitutes
irreparable injury. For example, many courts have held that denial of
constitutional rights constitutes irreparable injury.199 Regardless of
whether this is true, continued deprivation of constitutional rights does
not automatically mean the circumstances would change in such a way
as to render an appeal meaningless. A stay pending appeal of injunctive
relief precluding enforcement of a ban on same-sex marriage is a good
example. Gay people who are unable to marry are likely deprived of a
constitutional right pending appeal. But, that continued deprivation does
not interfere with the appellate court's ability to release a decision with
meaningful consequences. Another example worth considering is Abbott.
The Fifth Circuit found the State irreparably injured in its inability to
enforce its law. But that purported irreparable injury would not interfere
with the Fifth Circuit's ability to decide the merits meaningfully. 200 Cur-
rent notions of irreparable injury are less important to stays. Instead,
the focus should be on whether the circumstances would (irreparably)
change in a way that would interfere with the appellate court's ability to
make a decision meaningful to the parties.
Courts should also still consider the harm to the parties in the mean-
time, with or without a stay. English courts expressly looked at the harm
to the parties in determining whether to issue a stay pending appeal. 20 1
This factor is also relevant to the purposes of stays, which concern main-
taining the judicial review process for the parties. If staying injunctive
relief pending appeal affects the parties in some way relevant to their
interests in judicial review, courts should take that into consideration.
Last, courts should still consider the public interest. English courts
did not specifically mention this factor, but they did address how a stay,
or lack thereof, would affect the administration of justice.2 02 This factor is
199. See, e.g., Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347, 373 (1976) ("The loss of First Amendment free-
doms, for even minimal periods of time, unquestionably constitutes irreparable injury."); Ezell
v. City of Chi., 651 F.3d 684, 699 (7th Cir. 2011) ("[F]or some kinds of constitutional violations,
irreparable harm is presumed."); Adams By & Through Adams v. Baker, 919 F. Supp. 1496,
1505 (D. Kan. 1996) ("A deprivation of a constitutional right is, itself, irreparable harm.").
200. What would preclude a meaningful decision is if the clinics, unable to meet the admit-
ting privileges requirement, closed in the meantime. If so, any opinion by the Fifth Circuit
would be almost advisory because the closed clinics are unlikely to reopen even if the law is
found unconstitutional.
201. See supra notes 88-96 and accompanying text.
202. Id
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also relevant to the purposes of stays. Courts should consider if a stay is
necessary to prevent disruption in the legal system or the administration
of laws, or if the stay is necessary to ensure the courts can fulfill their
roles in the judicial system. This is a necessarily broad factor as there
are many ways that relief pending appeal, or lack thereof, could have
some negative consequence on the legal system or on society in general.
Again, same-sex marriage bans are a good example. If a lower court finds
the ban unconstitutional, there is still always the chance that the appel-
late court may reverse. The courts would then have to deal with the legal
statuses of any marriages that occurred in the meantime.
Considering the merits has led to the granting of stays that should
not have been granted under these three factors. Again, Abbott is an ex-
ample. The Fifth Circuit motions panel was thoroughly convinced of the
State's ability to win on the merits of the appeal. 2 03 So, it granted the
stay.2 04 By doing so, it rendered the merits panel's decision practically
meaningless-the stay caused the closure of clinics, which were unlikely
to reopen regardless of the merits decision. The Fifth Circuit should have
denied a stay, ensuring that the clinics would not close and the later
merits decision would be meaningful. Consideration of the merits led the
Fifth Circuit astray.
Considering the merits has also led to the denial of stays that should
have issued under these three factors. For example, when a district court
enjoins enforcement of a state's same-sex marriage ban. Even before
Obergefell v. Hodges, 205 the overwhelming majority of courts presented
with the question concluded that same-sex marriage bans were unconsti-
tutional, 206 meaning it was unlikely that the state would prevail on the
merits of the appeal. If the merits are a critical factor, then likely no stay
should have been granted. But granting a stay was appropriate because
of the public interest. On the off chance that the state is successful, what
would be the legal status of the marriages that occurred in the mean-
time? It's a close call, as a stay would undoubtedly harm gay couples
while the appeal is pending. But the potential legal mess is likely just
large enough to overwhelm that harm. Again, the merits led to inappro-
priate conclusions on the propriety of stays.
None of the three factors to be considered-possible changed circum-
stances rendering the appeal meaningless, harm to the parties, and the
public interest-is more important than the others, and they need not all
203. Planned Parenthood of Greater Tex. Surgical Health Servs. v. Abbott, 734 F.3d 406,
411-19 (5th Cir. 2013) (using all but four pages of the opinion to describe the state's likelihood of
succeeding on the merits of the appeal).
204. Id. at 419.
205. 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015) (declaring Michigan's, Ohids, Kentucky's, and Tennessee's bans
on same-sex marriage unconstitutional).
206. See infra note 231 (discussing how many courts found same-sex marriage bans
unconstitutional).
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be present to justify a court's discretionary decision to issue a stay.2 07
Any fear that these standards are too favorable, leading to increased ap-
peals, is likely exaggerated. 2 08 True, the strong showing on the merits
factor likely helps negate the chance of a stay,20 9 possibly making the ap-
peal less attractive. But these three factors also have that threshold
function. This is especially true with the suggested alterations to the ir-
reparable injury and public interest factors. It is not a rubber stamp
granting the stay simply because a constitutional deprivation is alleged
or because the state is unable to enforce a law. Instead, the court must
truly analyze whether a stay is necessary to preserve meaningful judicial
review or to prevent some undesirable consequence. Requiring explana-
tion of the reason for the grant or denial of the stay will help ensure that
honest analysis occurs.
IV. LEGITIMACY CONCERNS
Although Nken's emphasis on the merits has led many courts to ex-
tensively discuss the merits, it has not motivated every court. Most nota-
bly, the Supreme Court rarely explains the reasons for stays it grants or
denies. Without explanation, it is impossible to know if the Court even
evaluated the merits. The Supreme Court's vacation of the stay entered
by the Fifth Circuit in Whole Woman's Health is just one example. 21 0 The
lack of explanation and resulting impossibility of knowing the Court's
reasoning hurts the legitimacy of stay decisions.
A. Failing to Explain: Kitchen v. Herbert 21 1
On December 20, 2013, a Utah federal district court found Utah's ban
on same-sex marriage unconstitutional and enjoined the State from en-
forcing that law. Days later, the State asked the district court to stay
that injunction pending appeal, or at least temporarily stay the injunc-
tion to allow the Tenth Circuit to evaluate a stay. 2 1 2 The district court
denied the request using Nken.
207. Although the merits should not be relevant to whether the applicant is entitled to a
stay, the non-applicant also always has the option to move to dismiss the appeal as frivolous.
See Pillay v. INS, 45 F.3d 14, 17 (2d Cir. 1995) ("[The] court has inherent authority ... to dis-
miss an appeal or petition for review as frivolous when the appeal or petition presents no argu-
ably meritorious issue for our consideration."). This motion can occur well before the merits are
decided, limiting the effect of a stay.
208. It is difficult to take this fear too seriously, as stays pending appeal of monetary judg-
ments are available, almost as a matter of right. See supra notes 8-12 and accompanying text
(discussing the ease of obtaining a stay of a monetary judgment).
209. But see infra notes 234-36 (discussing Justice Thomas's description of the State's ease in
obtaining a stay in cases where a federal district court enjoins enforcement of a state law).
210. See supra Section II.C.2.
211. 134 S. Ct. 893 (2014) (mem.).
212. Kitchen v. Herbert, No. 2:13-cv-217, 2013 WL 6834634, at *1 (D. Utah Dec. 23, 2013).
2016] 1349
1350 FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITYLA WREVIEW
The district court first found that the State was unlikely to succeed
on appeal:
[T]he majority of the State's assertions in support of its argument are
the same assertions the State made in its Motion for Summary Judg-
ment. For the same reasons the court denied that motion, the court
finds that the State has not submitted any evidence that it is likely to
succeed on its appeal.2 13
Second, the district court found no irreparable harm to the State because
"its interest in preserving its previous laws about marriage" was not val-
id 214 and because no general public interest in enforcing legislature-
passed laws existed.215 Last, the district court dismissed any claim of ir-
reparable harm based on possible uncertainty for any same-sex couples
who marry while appeal is pending because it would not result in harm
to the State.2 16
The district court concluded its analysis finding that the last two
Nken factors did not weigh in favor of a stay.217 There was no doubt that
gay couples would face harm if not allowed to marry immediately; more
delay could seriously harm couples "facing serious illness or other issues
that do not allow them the luxury of waiting for such a delay." 218 And fi-
nally, although the State has an interest in enforcing its laws, the public
also has an interest in upholding gay couples' constitutional rights
to marry. 219
After being denied a stay pending appeal from the district court, the
State then petitioned the Tenth Circuit. 2 2 0 Two judges of the Tenth Cir-
cuit denied the motion. 2 2 1 The opinion cites the Nken factors,2 2 2 noting
that the likelihood of success on the merits and irreparable injury are the
most critical,223 but contains no analysis. Instead, it states: "Having con-
sidered the district court's decision and the parties' arguments concern-
ing the stay factors, we conclude that a stay is not warranted." 2 2 4
After the Tenth Circuit's denial, the State of Utah turned to the U.S.
Supreme Court for relief pending appeal. And there, it was successful.
213. Id at *2.
214. Id
215. Id at *3. If that were true, any decisions invalidating state law would be automatically
stayed. Id at *2.




220. Kitchen v. Herbert, No. 13-4178, 2013 U.S. App. LEXIS 26181, at *12 (10th Cir. Dec.
24, 2013).
221. Id at *13.
222. Id
223. Id
224. Id The judges did, however, "direct expedited consideration" of the appeal. Id
[Vol. 43:1319
STAYS OF INJUNCTIVE RELIEF
On Monday, January 6, 2014, the Court released the following two-
sentence order: "[The] application for stay presented to Justice So-
tomayor and by her referred to the Court is granted. Permanent injunc-
tion issued by the United States District Court . . . [is] stayed pending
final disposition of the appeal by the United States Court of Appeals for
the Tenth Circuit." 2 25
Because of the lack of substance, it is impossible to know why the
Court granted the stay after the two lower courts denied it. Was it con-
vinced that the State would likely succeed on the merits? Or did it believe
that the State would somehow be irreparably harmed? These questions
about Nken's two critical factors cannot be answered. The Court provided
no explanation regarding why its stay was appropriate under Nken.
Many thought that the stay signaled that the Supreme Court would
eventually grant certiorari and overrule any Tenth Circuit finding that
Utah's ban on same-sex marriage was unconstitutional. 2 2 6 But that did
not happen. Instead, months after the Tenth Circuit also found the ban
unconstitutional, 2 27 the Court denied multiple petitions for writ of certio-
rari in same-sex marriage cases, including Herbert.2 2 8 Technically, the
denial of certiorari says nothing about the merits of the case. 2 2 9 At the
same time, denial of certiorari makes little sense if the Court disagrees
with the merits of the lower court's conclusion that the ban was uncon-
stitutional. 23 0 Given the denial of certiorari, it does not appear that the
Court could have thought, months before, that the State of Utah made a
"strong showing" on its likelihood of succeeding on appeal to the Tenth
Circuit.231 Then, of course, in June 2015, the Court declared state bans on
225. Herbert v. Kitchen, 134 S. Ct. 893, 893 (2014) (mem.) (alteration of original typeface).
Eight months later, the Court also stayed the Fourth Circuit's injunction precluding enforce-
ment of Virginia's ban on same-sex marriage "pending the timely filing and disposition of a
petition for a writ of certiorari." McQuigg v. Bostic, 135 S. Ct. 32, 32 (2014).
226. See, e.g., Adam Liptak, Supreme Court Delivers Tacit Win to Gay Marriage, N.Y.
TIMES (Oct. 6, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/10/07/us/denying-review-justices-clear-way-
for-gay-marriage-in-5-states.html ("The nearly universal consensus from Supreme Court ob-
servers had been that the stays issued by the [J]ustices indicated that they wanted the last
word before federal courts transformed the landscape for same-sex marriage.").
227. Kitchen v. Herbert, 755 F.3d 1193, 1229-30 (10th Cir. 2014).
228. Herbert v. Kitchen, 135 S. Ct. 265 (2014); McQuigg v. Bostic, 135 S. Ct. 314 (2014);
Bogan v. Baskin, 135 S. Ct. 316 (2014); Walker v. Wolf, 135 S. Ct. 316 (2014); Schaefer v. Bostic,
135 S. Ct. 308 (2014); Smith v. Bishop, 135 S. Ct. 271 (2014).
229. See United States v. Carver, 260 U.S. 482, 490 (1923) ("The denial of a writ of certiora-
ri imports no expression of opinion upon the merits of the case.").
230. See Peter Linzer, The Meaning of Certiorari Denials, 79 COLUM. L. REV. 1227, 1255
(1979) (explaining that "it is hard to believe that the Justices almost always shut their minds to
the justness of a petitioner's case" in evaluating the petition for certiorari).
231. The pure volume of federal courts finding bans on same-sex marriage unconstitutional
also did not bode well for Utah's chances of succeeding. See, e.g., Hamby v. Parnell, 56 F. Supp.
3d 1056, 1064 (D. Alaska 2014) (listing the four federal appellate circuit courts that had found
bans on same-sex marriage unconstitutional); Condon v. Haley, 21 F. Supp. 3d 572, 582 (D.S.C.
2014) ("[A] clear majority of federal district courts that have addressed this issue have found
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same-sex marriage unconstitutional, also negating the chance that the
Court could have genuinely thought in January 2014 that the State of
Utah had made a "strong showing" it was likely to establish that Utah's
ban was constitutional. But the Court still granted the stay in Herbert.2 32
Maybe the Court now believes the merits to be less important than it
indicated in Nken. Justice Thomas's recent dissent to the Court's denial
of a stay in another (pre-Obergefel) same-sex marriage case, Strange v.
Searcy,233 indicates so. After a federal district court ruled Alabama's ban
on same-sex marriage unconstitutional, Alabama's Attorney General
asked for a stay of the injunction precluding enforcement pending ap-
peal. Unlike in Herbert, where the Court granted the stay without ex-
planation, this time, the Court denied the stay without explanation. 23 4
Justice Thomas dissented. He explained that the Court's "ordinary prac-
tice" is to stay injunctions pending appeal when lower federal courts en-
join enforcement of a state law found to be unconstitutional. 235 He ex-
plained this is so because states are often able to meet their burdens in
state same sex marriage bans unconstitutional."); Campaign for S. Equal. v. Bryant, 64 F. Supp.
3d 906, 951 (S.D. Miss. 2014) (explaining that since Windsor, no fewer than twenty state bans
on same-sex marriage had been found unconstitutional); see also Rosenbrahn v. Daugaard, 61
F. Supp. 3d 862, 870 (D.S.D. 2015) ("The majority of courts that have addressed the issue of the
constitutionality of same-sex marriage bans after Windsor have found that same-sex marriage
bans deprive homosexual couples of their fundamental constitutional right to marriage.").
232. An educated guess on why the Court granted the stay was its desire to avoid later possi-
ble administrative issues if the ban on same-sex marriage were later held constitutional. See
Burns v. Hickenlooper, No. 14-cv-01817-RM-KLM, 2014 WL 3634834, at *3 (D. Colo. July 23,
2014) ("[F]ederal courts have largely skipped a methodical assessment of those four factors in favor
of entering a stay due to the 'unsettled' nature of the constitutional questions regarding same-sex
marriage and the 'confusion, potential inequity, and high costs' that would likely result if the deci-
sion granting injunctive relief were reversed on appeal.").
The Court's stay decisions in same-sex marriage cases have been scattered since the cer-
tiorari denials in October 2014. Three days after those denials, without explanation, Justice
Kennedy issued a stay on the Ninth Circuit's injunctive relief precluding enforcement of Ida-
ho's ban on same-sex marriage. Otter v. Latta, 135 S. Ct. 345 (2014). Two days later, again
without explanation, the Court vacated Justice Kennedy's prior order, allowing same-sex
marriages to begin immediately in Idaho. Id In November 2014, without explanation, Justice
Sotomayor stayed a district court's injunction precluding enforcement of Kansas's ban on
same-sex marriage. Moser v. Marie, 135 S. Ct. 511 (2014). The Court vacated that stay days
later, again, without explanation. Id Without reasoning, there's no way to know what moti-
vated the granting of the stays in the first place. It appeared to almost be a courtesy-to al-
low the state a few days to prepare. That courtesy later disappeared, though, as the Court
began to deny stays, still without explanation. See, e.g., Strange v. Searcy, 135 S. Ct. 940
(2015) (denying Alabama's request for a stay of a district court injunction pending the Court's
review of the constitutionality of bans in Kentucky, Ohio, Tennessee, and Michigan, with
Justices Scalia and Thomas dissenting); Wilson v. Condon, 135 S. Ct. 702 (2014) (denying
South Carolina's request for a stay of a district court injunction pending review by the Fourth
Circuit Court of Appeals and, ultimately, the Supreme Court, but noting that Justices Scalia
and Thomas would have granted the stay); Parnell v. Hamby, 135 S. Ct. 399 (2014) (denying
Alaska's request for a stay of a district court injunction pending review by the Ninth Circuit
Court of Appeals and, ultimately, the Supreme Court).
233. 135 S. Ct. at 940.
234. Id
235. Id (Thomas, J., dissenting).
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these types of cases: "Because States are required to comply with the
Constitution, and indeed take care to do so when they enact their laws, it
is a rare case in which a State will be unable to make at least some
showing of a likelihood of success on the merits." 23 6 At least some show-
ing? And it's ordinary practice to require only this minimal showing?
Maybe the merits do not matter nearly as much as Nken states. Without
explanation, we cannot know.
B. No Reason for the Lack of Explanation
The failure to explain the denial or grant of a stay is even more curi-
ous given the ease of explanation. 23 7 The three factors advocated for con-
sideration in this Article-a possible change in circumstances precluding
the appellate court from issuing a meaningful decision to the parties, the
harm to the parties, and the public interest-are similar to the factors
courts use to evaluate preliminary injunctive relief. The Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure obligate courts to provide reasoning in decisions granting
or rejecting preliminary injunctive relief.23 8 Courts should similarly be
able to provide a statement of reasons for granting or denying a stay
pending appeal.
A court can easily explain why the circumstances could change in a
way that would affect the usefulness of the result of the appeal. The dis-
sent to the Supreme Court's refusal to vacate the stay in Abbott did ex-
actly that. Justice Breyer explained that vacation of the stay was neces-
sary because otherwise abortion clinics would close and be unlikely to
reopen 2 39-negating the usefulness of the appeal. Any difficulty in ex-
plaining the changed circumstances suggests there is no such situation
and perhaps no need for a stay.
236. Id (emphasis added). Justice Thomas's dissent is also interesting in how he compares
the stay issued in Herbert, but denied in Strange. He claimed that the stay in Herbert showed
that the Court should have also issued a stay in Strange. Id The later denials of the petitions of
certiorari in Herbert, however, imply that the Court did not believe that the State had a merito-
rious appeal. Thus, under Nken, no stays should have been issued in either case. In Strange,
the Court may have actually considered the merits as Nken dictates, concluding that the State
of Alabama could not establish a "strong showing" of its likelihood to succeed on the merits, and
thus properly denied the stay. See id at 941 (criticizing the Court's failure to grant a stay as a
"signal of the Court's intended resolution of' the constitutionality of bans on same-sex marriage).
237. This argument applies even if the merits are still considered. A stay in a case like Her-
bert or Strange would have required the Court to evaluate Fourteenth Amendment law to de-
termine whether the state had made a strong showing that it was likely to succeed on appeal.
However, even if the Court undertook the equal protection analysis, it should have been able to
explain its decision, just like the merits panel would eventually explain its analysis.
238. FED. R. CIV. P. 65(d) ("Every order granting an injunction ... must: (A) state the rea-
sons why it issued."). If a court granted affirmative injunctive relief pending appeal, the court
would have to comply with 65(d) and "set forth the reasons for its issuance." 11 WRIGHT ET AL.,
supra note 7, § 2904, at 707.
239. Planned Parenthood of Greater Tex. Surgical Health Sers. v. Abbott, 134 S. Ct. 506,
509 (2013) (Breyer, J., dissenting).
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It is also relatively easy to explore how a stay could cause harm to
parties. The District of Utah did exactly that in denying a stay after it
found Utah's ban on same-sex marriage unconstitutional. 240 The court
explained that a stay would preclude the State of Utah from enforcing its
law (although harm was discounted by the fact that the law was likely
unconstitutional). 24 1 The court also explored how a stay would continue
to preclude same-sex couples from getting married.2 42 These are factors
that should be weighed in determining whether to grant relief
pending appeal.
Last, it is not difficult to explain why the public interest favors a stay.
The Southern District of Ohio was able to find the necessary words when
staying its injunction precluding enforcement of Ohio's ban on same-sex
marriage. If the State was successful on appeal, "the absence of a stay as
to this Court's ruling of facial unconstitutionality is likely to lead to con-
fusion, potential inequity, and high costs. These considerations lead the
Court to conclude that the public interest would best be served by the
granting of a stay." 2 4 3
Specific explanation of the bases for granting or denying a stay of in-
junctive relief pending appeal is possible. 2 4 4 And it is necessary if stay
decisions are going to maintain any semblance of legitimacy.
C. How Lack of Explanation Hurts the Legitimacy of Stay Decisions
To be legally legitimate, a court decision must be lawful. 2 45 Thus, legit-
imacy turns on whether the decision complies with the law. 2 4 6 To demon-
240. Kitchen v. Herbert, No. 2:13-cv-217, 2013 WL 6834634, at *2-3 (D. Utah Dec. 23,
2013).
241. Id
242. Id at *3.
243. Henry v. Himes, No. 1:14-cv-129, 2014 WL 1512541, at *1 (S.D. Ohio Apr. 16, 2014).
Notably, the court denied the stay for the as-applied findings of unconstitutionality for the eight
individual plaintiffs who had "demonstrated that a stay will irreparably harm them individually
due to the imminent births of their children and other time-sensitive concerns, (as well as due
to the continuing Constitutional violations)." Id
244. The Supreme Court has recently been criticized for its failure to explain its decisions deny-
ing certiorari in same-sex marriage cases. See, e.g, Robert Barnes, Supreme Court's Actions Are
Monumental but the Why of Its Reasoning Is Often Missing, WASH. POST (Oct. 12, 2014),
http://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/courts_1aw/supreme-courts-actions-aremonumental-but-the-
why-of-its-reasoning-often-missing/2014/10/12/calcc9c-4fea-1 1e4-8c24-487e92bc997bVstory.html;
Adam Liptak, Justices Drawing Dotted Lines with Terse Orders in Big Cases, N.Y. TIMES (Oct.
27, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/10/28/us/supreme-court-with-terse-ordershas-judges-and-
lawyers-reading-tea-leaves.html; Dahlia Lithwick, Injunction Junction: What Is the Supreme
Court Thinking Behind its Unfathomable Silence2 SLATE (Oct. 16, 2014), http://
www.slate.com/articles/news-andpolitics/jurisprudence/2014/10/supreme-court-unsigned-orders
stays-and-injunctions-noexplanationsjin-voter.html. "Review on a writ of certiorari," however, is
purely a matter of "judicial discretion." SUP. CT. R. 10. There are no specific factors the Court is
supposed to consider when deciding to grant review. Id. The Court's Rules include a list of reasons
that are "neither controlling nor fully measuring the Court's discretion" for which the Court may
grant review, including factors like a circuit split. Id. But there is no set, governing standard. Id.
And if that is true, there is really nothing for the Court to explain in the denial.
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strate legal legitimacy, the Court need only explore the legal reasons for
the decision; "the opinion must consist of a full and candid exposition of
the Court's reasoning. "247 Without the reasoning, the decision is legally
illegitimate because there is no assurance "that the Court's ruling com-
plies with the law." 24 8
Legitimacy is also important because it justifies the ruling. "Justifica-
tion is the primary way the Court can influence other participants in the
legal system. There is a strong connection between reasons and rules,
and decisions without reasons generally cannot constrain future ac-
tors."'249 In more practical terms, the consequences of failing to explain
are that "no one would take the opinions seriously, briefs could not credi-
bly cite them as authority, lower court judges would lack guidance, and
doctrinal scholarship would be useless." 2 50
These consequences are evident in lower courts' treatment of the
Court's stay in Herbert. In Wolf v. Walker,251 Judge Crabb of the Western
District of Wisconsin considered the Nken factors. If she was "consider-
ing these factors as a matter of first impression, [she] would be inclined
to agree with plaintiffs that defendants have not shown that they are
entitled to a stay." 2 52 Although "I[i]t is impossible to know the Court's rea-
soning for issuing the stay," other courts have followed it and Judge
Crabb felt obligated to do the same. 253
Judge Moore of the District of Colorado refused to give Herbert some
sort of precedential effect because of its lack of legal legitimacy:
[I]t appears to the Court that it may well be that a message is being
sent by the Supreme Court. But this Court is not some modern day ha-
ruspex skilled in the art of divination. This Court cannot-and, more
importantly, it will not-tell the people of Colorado that the access to
this or any other fundamental right will be delayed because it "thinks"
or "perceives" the subtle-or not so subtle-content of a message not
directed to this case. The rule of law demands more. 254
245. Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Legitimacy and the Constitution, 118 HARV. L. REV. 1787, 1794
(2005).
246. Wells, supra note 170, at 1020.
247. Id. at 1020-21.
248. Id. at 1020.
249. Eric J. Segall, Justice O'Connor and the Rule ofLaw, 17 U. FLA. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 107,
111 (2006) (footnote omitted).
250. Wells, supra note 170, at 1021.
251. 26 F. Supp. 3d 866 (W.D. Wis. 2014).
252. Id. at 873.
253. Id.
254. Burns v. Hickenlooper, No. 14-cv-01817-RM-KLM, 2014 WL 3634834, at *5 (D. Colo.
July 23, 2014). Judge Moore did grant a temporary stay of his preliminary injunction precluding
enforcement of Colorado's same-sex marriage ban to enable the parties to seek a stay from the
Tenth Circuit or the Supreme Court. Id. He also stayed all future proceedings in the case pend-
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Judge Moore's mention of the rule of law is also related to the legal legit-
imacy of court decisions. The classic conception of the rule of law is that
"something other than the mere will of the individuals deputized to exer-
cise government powers must have primacy"; the government should be
a "government of laws" and not a "government of men." 255 Also part of the
rule of law concept is that law must be external so that each public offi-
cial is bound by it. Then, a result should not change even if the deci-
sionmaker is different.
A failure to explain is inconsistent with the rule of law because it
promotes the perception that we have a government of men-not of laws.
Without an explanation, maybe the law did not govern, maybe the judge
did. And if a different judge was presented with the same motion for a
stay, he may have found differently because of a different whim. "A re-
quirement that judges give reasons for their decisions-grounds of deci-
sion that can be debated, attacked, and defended-serves a vital function
in constraining the judiciary's exercise of power." 25 6 This constraint is
necessary even when the decision is equitable. Stay decisions can and
should comply with the rule of law because discretion is guided and con-
strained by external law. 25 7
The failure to explain the basis of a stay decision also hurts the opin-
ion's legal legitimacy because it creates the perception of inconsisten-
cy.258 Why in one case would the possibility of changed circumstances
justify a stay, but a similar possibility of changed circumstances be in-
sufficient in another case? Or, using actual cases, why was the State of
Texas's injury in its inability to enforce abortion restrictions enough to
help justify the Court's refusal to vacate the stay in Abbott, but not in
Whole Woman's Health?
ing the resolution of Kitchen v Herbert in the Tenth Circuit and possibly in the United State
Supreme Court. Id
255. RONALD A. CASS, THE RULE OF LAW IN AMERICA 3 (2001) (quoting MASS. CONST.
(1780)).
256. David L. Shapiro, In Defense ofJudicial Candor, 100 HARv. L. REV. 731, 737 (1987).
257. Nken v. Holder, 556 U.S. 418, 434 (2009) (explaining that a decision to issue a stay is
discretionary, but it is not a motion to the court's "inclination, but to its judgment; and its
judgment is to be guided by sound legal principles" (quoting Martin v. Franklin Capital Corp.,
546 U.S. 132, 139 (2005))).
258. Professor Richard Hasen recently explored the appearance of inconsistency resulting
from four Supreme Court opinions released in the month before the 2014 election. Richard L.
Hasen, Reining in the Purcell Principle, 43 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. (forthcoming 2016). The orders
included: 1) staying an order, precluding enforcement of North Carolina's voter registration law;
2) vacating a stay of an order, allowing Wisconsin's voter identification law to go into effect; 3)
refusing to vacate a stay, allowing Texas's voter identification law to go into effect; and 4) stay-
ing an order, precluding enforcement of Ohio election laws. Id Professor Hasen explains that,
obviously, " [t]he orders appeared contradictory." Id (man uscript at 1) (on file with author). He
also argues that had the Court applied the standards for emergency stays appropriately, there
are strong arguments that the Court concluded incorrectly in the Texas and North Carolina
cases. Id
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Because of the equitable nature of the decisions, some inconsistency is
inevitable. But experience with preliminary injunctions also shows that
consistency is possible and desirable. There should be similarities in how
much circumstances must change so as to preclude an appellate court
from issuing a decision meaningful to the parties. There should also be
similarities in how courts weigh the harms to both parties resulting from
a stay and in courts' conclusions regarding what kind of public interests
weigh in favor of a stay. It is, of course, possible that due to other cir-
cumstances, a stay might be appropriate for one stay applicant but not
another even with similar harms. But there should be some explanation
of why. Otherwise, the decisions just seem inconsistent and illegitimate.
On a related note, explanation is needed to increase legitimacy de-
spite possibly limited precedential effect. Admittedly, some stay deci-
sions will have limited precedential effect because of particularity to fac-
tual circumstances. The same could be said of preliminary injunction de-
cisions, however, which are required to be explained, are appealable, and
provide the bases for arguments in other motions for preliminary injunc-
tions. Regardless, not all stay decisions will be limited to their facts. 2 59
One need look no further than Abbott or Herbert to see that. Numerous
states could pass abortion laws similar to the ones at issue in Abbott or
Whole Woman's Health. Legitimate decisions on stays in Abbott and
Whole Woman's Health could then have far-reaching consequences. The
vast majority of states had same-sex marriage bans similar to the one at
issue in Herbert. If the Court's stay in Herbert lacked precedential value
because of its particularity to facts, many, many courts erroneously felt
obligated to follow it.2 6 0
Strict precedential value aside, explanation would improve legitimacy
and provide better guidance for lower courts. Would the stay in Whole
Woman's Health have closed too many abortion clinics while appeal was
pending? Did that result impose too much harm on women-is that the
relevant difference between Whole Woman's Health and Abbott? Howev-
er the Court quantified that conclusion, it would be helpful for lower
courts to know because they could follow it. The Fifth Circuit noted as
259. See Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 690, 698 (1996) (concluding that even though
precedent in reasonable-suspicion and probable-cause decisions will have limited value because
of the specificity to facts, "there are exceptions" where one decision will control another); see
also id ("And even where one case may not squarely control another one, the two decisions
when viewed together may usefully add to the body of law on the subject.").
260. See, e.g., Latta v. Otter, 771 F.3d 496, 499 (9th Cir. 2014); Bishop v. Smith, 760 F.3d
1070, 1096 (10th Cir. 2014); Kitchen v. Herbert, 755 F.3d 1193, 1230 (10th Cir. 2014); Jernigan
v. Crane, 64 F. Supp. 3d 1260, 1287-88 (E.D. Ark. 2014); Condon v. Haley, 21 F. Supp. 3d 572,
588-89 (D.S.C. 2014); Marie v. Moser, 65 F. Supp. 3d 1175, 1205-06 (D. Kan. 2014); Brenner v.
Scott, 999 F. Supp. 2d 1278, 1292 (N.D. Fla. 2014); Wolf v. Walker, 26 F. Supp. 3d 866, 873
(W.D. Wis. 2014); De Leon v. Perry, 975 F. Supp. 2d 632, 666 (W.D. Tex. 2014); Bourke v.
Beshear, 996 F. Supp. 2d 542, 558 (W.D. Ky. 2014); Bishop v. United States ex rel. Holder, 962
F. Supp. 2d 1252, 1296 (N.D. Okla. 2014).
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much in its merits decision in Whole Woman's Health: "[N]o guidance
can be gleaned from the Supreme Court's vacating portions of the stay
without explanation, as we cannot discern the underlying reasoning from
the one-paragraph order." 2 6 1 If lower courts had more guidance, it could
affect their decisions and maybe ultimately reduce the need for parties to
later seek relief pending appeal from the Supreme Court. Similarly, in
Herbert, what was it that justified the stay? Was it the possible later
problem of the legal status of marriages that would occur while appeal
was pending? If so, it would have been helpful for lower courts to know
so they could prevent that from occurring. Being clear about the reasons
a stay is necessary would also have reduced the need for parties to later
seek relief pending appeal from the Supreme Court.
V. CONCLUSION
Even while litigation and appeals are proceeding, life continues. This
creates a difficult dilemma. As the Court put it in Nken, what should
courts do "when there is insufficient time to resolve the merits and irrep-
arable harm may result from [the] delay"? 2 62 Oddly, a "critical" part of
the solution in Nken is to still attempt to resolve the merits within that
insufficient time. Thus, within a matter of days, and with less than com-
plete information, the court must determine whether the applicant made
a "strong showing" on the merits of his claim that the trial court erred in
its decision. This solution makes one wonder why a panel could effective-
ly decide the merits so quickly, but the ultimate decision on the merits of
the appeal may often take a year or more.
Regardless, Nken's emphasis on the merits is not supported histori-
cally, theoretically, or practically. Really, the merits just get in the way
of the factors that should govern stays. Those are the factors consistent
with historical practices and theoretical purposes-whether circum-
stances could change in a way that would render the appellate court un-
able to issue a decision meaningful to the parties, how the parties might
be harmed by the relief, or lack thereof, and the public interest.
Necessarily, courts must also explain how these factors led them to
either grant or deny a stay. Without explanations, stay decisions look
random and unjustified-illustratively, staying the enforcement of some
abortion restrictions, but not others, or staying the enforcement of some
same-sex marriage bans, but not others. Although overlooked, stays play
an important part in judicial review, both for courts and parties. Every
effort should be made to ensure that stay decisions are legitimate.
261. Whole Woman's Health v. Cole, 790 F.3d 563, 580 (5th Cir. 2015).
262. Nken, 556 U.S. at 432. Besides the Court's listing of the four Nken factors, this is really
the only substantive mention of the relevance of the merits in Nken.
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